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During the elections for the European Parliament in June 2009, an unknown party in 
Sweden turned out to be very successful. The Pirate Party, campaigning for patents to 
be scrapped and copyright to last just five years instead of 70, received 7% of the 
votes in the Scandinavian country, giving the party the right to a seat in the Parliament 
in Brussels. These modern day pirates are most successful in Sweden, but similar 
parties exist in the United States and a number of European countries as well.
1
 
 In modern society, copyrights, patents, and other forms of intellectual property 
play a bigger role in normal life than they did one or two decades ago. This 
development makes people more aware of all the effects of intellectual property 
theory and policy cause. It also brings up the discussion concerning whether the 
original goals of the policies are still being pursued properly. Is the chosen path in IP 
law still a valid one in this digital age or is it time to rethink the structure? 
 A political theory that widely assesses IP rights is libertarianism. This political 
philosophy, based on individual freedom through private property, has had my interest 
for some years now, and I have found out that whether one supports the doctrine or 
not, the link with private property creates an extremely wide range of interesting 
views on IP. A very convenient side effect is that the (significant amount of) 
libertarian theorists who do not believe in IP rights, publish their writings on the 
World Wide Web for free, which stimulates extensive research. 
 In this research project, besides fulfilling my desire to learn more about the 
libertarian philosophy, my goal is to show how within an apparently harmonious body 
of thought, much controversy can exist regarding one of the pillars of its theory (a 
form of property). First, I want to give sufficient analyses regarding libertarianism in 
general. Then, I shall discuss the libertarian views on property. In the third chapter I 
will focus on the theories of intellectual property theory, and chapter four will be 
dedicated to the complete range of libertarian opinions regarding these theories. In the 
last chapter I want to pay attention to critics who base their views on different (but 
still liberal) ideologies, with regard to the general libertarian philosophy and the 
practical elaboration of IP rights in the modern society. 
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The essay contains not only a legal basis, but deals with philosophy, economy, 
politics and technology as well. This diversity is in my opinion not only very 
interesting, but also necessary for legal research today, since nowadays one can lose 
oneself quite easily in extremely detailed legal issues, while the political and 
economical reasoning behind it is ignored. 
It is not my goal to prove a certain theory, regulation or opinion right or 
wrong, although I shall intensively analyze and critically approach them while not 
hesitating to express my own opinion where I think it is necessary. The aim of this 
paper is to provide the reader with a clear overview of the similarities and differences 













1. The libertarian theory 
 
The idea that most people have when they think about libertarianism is probably “an 
extreme form of liberalism.” In some cases this might be true, but it does not give us 
any fundamental information regarding the thoughts of the liberal theorists. 
Ultimately, the aim of this paper is to critically assess the thoughts that libertarians (or 
laissez-faire theorists) have on intellectual property law. However, to understand these 
opinions, it is necessary to have a proper understanding of the background of the body 
of thought of these writers, theorists, economists and politicians. In the first chapter I 
wish to explain the roots of the libertarian idea, consider the visions of the main 
characters in libertarian history, and discuss the position that libertarianism has in the 
world today. In order to have a better understanding of the rest of this thesis, this 
chapter should make the reader aware of what libertarianism is, but also what 
libertarianism is not. In the last few centuries, an impressive amount of literature has 
been produced with regard to this topic. Many liberal philosophers, legalists and – 
above all – economists from all over the world have produced books and articles 
regarding this subject, all of them with a common, general liberal background, but 
with their own unique views too. It will be a challenge to filter the variations and 
come up with “the general libertarian theory,” but the reader should keep in mind that 
it is simply a clarification of the foundations for the following chapters.  
 
 
1.1 The basis of libertarianism 
 
One could say that the only thing that really matters in the doctrine of libertarianism is 
individual liberty. Everyone has the right to do whatever he wants, and because that 
counts for every single person, there is a need for respect for the liberty of others. Jan 
Narveson starts his work “The libertarian Idea” with the following definition:  
 
„[The doctrine is] that there is a delimitable sphere of action for each person, 
the person‟s “rightful liberty,” such that one may be forced to do or refrain 
from what one wants to do only if what one would do or not do would violate, 












reasons for compelling people are allowable: other actions touching on the life 




Narveson adds that later on in his study, the idea will be refined, but it will only be a 
refinement of the particular idea, rather than some hybrid of evolutionary version.  
Let us consider how different the belief in the single rule “other people are not 
your property” is from other visions that seem to have more support nowadays. 
Libertarianism is one form of liberalism, and by other parties often incorrectly 
generalized. Although many writers tend to think about libertarians as structural 
opponents in the political arena, it is impossible to call libertarians left- or right-
winged. One can take American politics as a simple example: the Right has 
completely different ideas than liberals regarding the war on drugs, prostitution, 
gambling, pornography and other vices and the way the government (in relation with 
the church) ought to deal with these subjects. The Left, on the other hand, wants the 
government to regulate the economy intensively using progressive taxation and efforts 
to equalize. This is in no way compatible with the liberal view. The main aspect that 
distinguishes Left and Right from libertarians (from a philosophical point of view) is 




 century, several theorists – of which the majority was specialized in 
economics – developed their views on liberty and state. With ideas based on writers 
from earlier ages (like Aristotle, Adam Smith and John Locke) a new generation of 
libertarians arose, and continues to play a very important role in today‟s views. 
Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, Robert Nozick and Friedich Hayek are some of 
the theorists whose ideas still form the basis of almost all of today‟s publications in 
the libertarian context. These laissez-faire writers have in common that they criticize 
the political and economic situations of their time, and propose how more prosperity 
can be found by an increased attention and valuation of individual freedom. 
Nowadays, their visions are the basis of libertarian organizations such as The Mises 
Institute and The CATO Institute. These two examples of cooperating free market 
supporters play an important role in critically assessing world policy from a 
libertarian point of view.  
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Libertarians advocate a minimal state, an ultraminimal state, or even the 
absence of a state. Many people thus believe that libertarians are utopians who believe 
that all people are good, and that therefore state control is not necessary. If this were 
true, I would not have put in the effort to write a dissertation on this topic. In an 
article written in 1980, Murray Rothbard handles various – what he calls – myths 
about libertarianism. According to this specific misunderstanding he makes clear that 
there are no libertarian writers who have held this “romantic” view. „On the contrary, 
most libertarian writers hold that man is a mixture of good and evil and therefore that 
it is important for social institutions to encourage the good and discourage the bad.‟
3
 
However, it is a known fact that right now the only social institution able to gather 
income and wealth by coercion is the state. Everyone else can do this only by trade in 
goods or services, or by receiving voluntary gifts. Furthermore, the state is the only 
(possible) institution to use the revenue of this coercion to regulate the life and 
property of the people. To illustrate the problem about this power according to 
libertarians, Rothbard quotes economist Frank Knight: „The probability of the people 
in power being individuals who would dislike the possession and exercise of power is 
on a level with the probability that an extremely tenderhearted person would get the 
job of whipping master in a slave plantation.‟
4
 Libertarians believe that the allocation 
of this power to the state is part of the problem of tyranny in society, and is exactly 
what should be changed: „Liberty and the free market discourage aggression and 
compulsion, and encourage the harmony and mutual benefit of voluntary interpersonal 
exchanges, economic, social, and cultural.‟
5
 
I think these words are chosen to form an answer to the fear that exists in a 
world with unlimited liberty. This does make sense, because while many individuals 
are unhappy with certain choices and actions of governments, on the other hand the 
state gives them an overall feeling of safety and certainty. “It might not be perfect, but 
at least we know what we can expect.” So the challenge for libertarians is to convince 
these people of the idea that safety and certainty will not vanish in a free market with 
a minimal state. Rothbard uses the following description for the philosophy: 
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„Libertarianism is a political philosophy which says: Given any existent 
human nature, liberty is the only moral and the most effective political system. 
Obviously, libertarianism – as well as any other social system – will work 
better the more individuals are peaceful and the less they are criminal or 
aggressive. And libertarians, along with most other people, would like to attain 
a world where more individuals are “good” and fewer are criminals. But this is 
not the doctrine of libertarianism per se, which says that whatever the mix of 




Considering what the libertarian body of thought comprises, I want to stick with the 
aspects that matter for the subject of this thesis. This means I will discuss the basic 
libertarian vision on government, law and economy. The next chapter will deal with 
the views on property law.  
 
 
1.2 Libertarians and the government 
 
The ultimate libertarian program would be the abolition of the public sector and a 
conversion of all governmental operations and services to voluntary-based activities 
undertaken by the private sector. It seems hard for many people to believe in the 
feasibility of a world without government interference, so libertarians owe us a more 
detailed explanation regarding the (ultra)minimal state. In 1973, Rothbard wrote For a 
New Liberty: The libertarian Manifesto in which he makes his (libertarian) view very 
clear. Using some examples, I wish to show how libertarians have established their 
case for a free market without a government. 
A very common first response to the libertarian idea is the question: who will 
provide us with roads and basic infrastructure when there is no government? Of 
course, the libertarian answer to this is “the free market” (in combination with private 
property). Abolition of the public sector means automatically that all the land 
(including roads) is owned privately. So everything is owned by individuals, 
companies or other groups of people and capital. It is not hard to imagine how 
railroads and airlines can work when privatized and unsubsidized, and highways with 
toll-gates are already used by governments, but when it comes to streets and roads 
Rothbard gives several examples of how private enterprises in combination with 
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modern technology can come up with rational, feasible solutions.
7
 Not only the 
“street-owner,” but also merchants along roads and in towns will have a vested 
interest in having proper streets and safe neighborhoods, which encourages them to 
invest and come up with modern, creative solutions.  
Another important form of criticism, and probably the most important one, 
deals with the area where critics really think a government is essential: policy, law 
and courts. In his recent work Deleting the State, Aeon Skoble summarizes the 
different libertarian views and divides the laissez-faire theorists into anarcho-
libertarians and minimal-statists. Skoble explains that what separates the two is how 
the minimal statists are influenced in their liberal views by what he calls the 
Hobbesian Fear, after the views of 17
th
 century philosopher Thomas Hobbes.  
 
„Simply stated, a Hobbesian Fear is the notion that political authority is 
necessary for society to exist; more specifically, that political authority is the 
only way to secure enforcement of contract and is therefore a necessary 
condition of the social cooperation that is essential for life. If we did not have 





Skoble thinks that minimal-statists are wrong, and that the true libertarian is the 
libertarian anarchist. He means that the Hobbesian Fear can be proven wrong by 
“game theory,” and uses an example similar to the “prisoners dilemma.”
9
 The essence 
of this theory is that, according to Skoble, the Hobbesian Fear is an irrational one, 
because when it comes to disputes or dilemmas in society, it is most beneficial for the 
individuals involved to cooperate, instead of counteract each other‟s interests. This 
way he means to prove Rothbard‟s philosophy in a theoretical way. 
Anarcho-libertarians think a society without a government can still be safe and 
just. First, this means that according to libertarians, private protection services in a 
free market are a proper alternative to ensure safety and security for individuals. 
Rothbard gives examples of how these agencies should be seen in a modern society, 
and gives sensible arguments to support such a system over the current one.
10
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Secondly, there is the issue of courts and jurisdiction. Although it seems hard 
to imagine private courts in a free market, which have the right to try free individuals, 
libertarians have their reasons to argue in favor of such a system. Skoble calls this a 
polycentral legal theory and explains – based on works of Nozick, Rothbard, Barnett 
and some others – how libertarians think a legal and judicial system is possible 
without the influence of the public sector.
11
  
I would like to add what Hans-Hermann Hoppe stated in an interview about 
Ludwig von Mises, regarding the question of the state. Hoppe uses Mises‟ words to 
make the idea of a stateless society in which safety and order are guaranteed more 
feasible: 
 
„Mises thought it was necessary to have an institution that suppresses those 
people who cannot behave appropriately in society, people who are a danger 
because they steal and murder. He calls this institution government. But he has 
a unique idea of how government should work. To check its power, every 
group and every individual, if possible, must have the right to secede from the 
territory of the state. He called this the right of self determination, not of 
nations as the League of Nations said, but of villages, districts, and groups of 
any size. In Liberalism and Nation, State, and Economy, he elevates secession 
to a central principle of classical liberalism. If it were possible to grant this 
right of self-determination to every individual person, he says, it would have 





What Hoppe makes clear here, is that – of course – libertarians acknowledge the 
presence of people who are a danger to society. However, since individual freedom is 
the most important right, individuals should have the right to self-determine whether 
or not they want to be ruled by this “government” and how far the power of these 
leading bodies reaches for them in particular. It is questionable if one can call an 
institution of which one can secede yourself a government, but Mises‟ interesting idea 
of the state is definitely something completely different from the only institution with 
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1.3 Libertarians and the economy 
 
The remarks I made in the paragraph above are in response to the fact that individual 
freedom has great value for libertarians. This basic value, in combination with the 
ideas regarding government, law and courts, implies quite radical views in the field of 
economics as well. Without a doubt, the most important one is “without a state, no 
taxation.”  
Probably the most well known publication in the field of libertarian economic 
views is Economics in One Lesson, written by Henry Hazlitt, and based on an article 
from 1863 written by famous libertarian (law) theorist Frederic Bastiat.
13
 The “one 
lesson” is the following: „The art of economics consists in looking not merely at the 
immediate but at the longer effects of any act or policy; it consists in tracing the 
consequences of that policy not merely for one group but for all groups.‟
14
 Hazlitt 
exemplifies this lesson by explaining the effects of one common economic belief, and 
proving that common economic belief to be a fallacy.  
 The advocates of free market economy and their ideas are commonly referred 
to as the Austrian School of economics. The reason for this is that, in the 19
th
 century, 
economists with the same laissez-faire views on money, market and economic theory 
were centered in Austrian universities.
15
 Libertarianism has – and always has had – a 
great deal to do with economics, but it comprises more than that. The Austrian School 
can be seen as the economic representation of libertarianism.  
Completely based on the thought that the economy will rule itself and is not 
helped with state intervention, the Austrian School can be characterized as „a full-
fledged defence of a capitalistic and stateless social order, based on property and 
freedom of association and contract.‟
16
 The Austrian school (or Vienna School, or 
Psychological School) is definitely not mainstream economic thought. It is a 
controversial, heterodox school of economics whose ideas are generally not applied in 
modern politics. This is not surprising since it represents the belief that a government 
should not interfere in economics. The Austrian School consists of rigorous laissez 
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faire-views on taxation, inflation, money production, economic growth, subsidies, and 





Libertarians care about individual liberty. Their thoughts are not explicitly right or left 
in the political spectrum, but focus on a minimal state, or even the absence of a state. 
This does not mean that libertarians have the illusion that all people in society are 
good. Rather, libertarians believe that liberty and the free market discourage 
aggression and encourage harmony and mutual benefit with regard to economy and 
society. Concerning government, laissez-faire theorists expressly disagree with the 
notion that political authority is a necessary condition of the social cooperation that is 
essential for life. Rather, they share the opinion that in a free market-society, people 
will intensively cooperate when they find out that effectively, cooperation is most 
beneficial.  
The idea of a “state” as an organization that takes care of people‟s interests in 
exchange for a payment (taxes) is in the eyes of a libertarian not necessarily a bad 
thing, as long as this process takes place voluntarily. What libertarians find 
problematic is the coercion of people by governments, subjecting them to involuntary 












2 Libertarian views on property  
 
One of the main things libertarian writers have in common is the opinion that property 
rights are of high importance and should be respected. However, it is not self-evident 
that property rights are essential for the existence of the advocated liberty. In this 
chapter, I want to make clear the exact reasoning for the importance of property 
rights. I shall also compare libertarian views to approaches that are based on 
principles other than the thoughts of free enterprisers. The ethical and philosophical 
reasoning that is used by famous libertarian theorists is an interesting topic that shapes 
the basis of several approaches to different property laws, and therefore gives reason 





I would like to start with a hypothetical situation concerning scarcity, based on an 
example that is brought forward by Hoppe.
17
 Let‟s say one person, X, lives on an 
island, where he can do as he pleases.  Because he is alone, no questions arise 
concerning rules of orderly human conduct (social cooperation). This question will 
play a role only once another person, Y, arrives on the island. However, with two 
people on this island, the question of social cooperation need not be raised unless 
scarcity exists. For now, we suppose there is no scarcity on the island. All external 
goods are available in superabundance (as in the Garden of Eden). Everything is 
“free,” just as our daily sunlight and the air we breathe. Whatever X may do with 
these goods, none of his actions will cause (unpleasant) consequences for present or 
future supply of such goods, for himself or for Y. The same can be said about the way 
Y uses the goods. Because of the absence of scarcity, it is impossible that there could 
be a conflict between X and Y regarding the use of such goods. A conflict is only 
possible if goods are scarce. Only then the need to formulate rules that make orderly 
(conflict free) social cooperation possible, arises.  
However, there are scarce goods in the Garden of Eden: the physical body of a 
person and its standing room. X and Y both have only one body and they can stand 
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only at one place at one time. This scarcity can indeed cause problems, even in the 
Garden of Eden. Namely, they cannot occupy the same standing room without coming 
into physical conflict with each other. So even in this wonderful place, rules of 
orderly social conduct should exist in order to avoid these physical conflicts. „And 
outside the Garden of Eden, in the realm of scarcity, there must be rules that regulate 
not only the use of personal bodies but also of everything scarce so that all possible 
conflicts can be ruled out. This is the problem of social order.‟
18
 
The mentioned example could use a more detailed view on what society would 
be like if it recognized only liberty rights and no other. Nozick, writer of arguably the 
most important work in the field of the minimal state (Anarchy, State, and Utopia), 
divided the space for principles on the subject of property into three classes: 
  
„(1) initial acquisition, that is, the acquisition of property rights in external 
things from a previous condition in which they were unowned by anyone in 
particular; (2) transfer, that is, the passing of property (that is to say, property 
rights) from one rightholder to another; and (3) rectification, which is the 
business of restoring just distributions of property when they have been upset 




The first two classes are of particular importance to clarify the need for the 
recognition of property and why it provides society with the structure it is said to 
create. To be able to conclude why it is (private) property that solves the problem of 




2.2 The libertarian property doctrine 
 
Seventeenth century philosopher John Locke is famous for his theory of value and 
property. It is used by the majority of the libertarian writers as a basis for private 
property theories. Locke wrote about property in both a broad and narrower sense. In 
the broad sense he meant property to cover a wide range of human interests and 
aspirations. The narrow definition refers to material goods. The allocation of property 
is, according to Locke, derived from labor. Once a place or good has been 
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appropriated, by mixing one‟s labor with it, ownership of such places and goods can 
be acquired only by means of a voluntary – contractual – transfer of property title 
from a previous to a new owner. In addition to this, property precedes government 
and government cannot „dispose of the estates of the subjects arbitrarily.‟
20
 
To understand how libertarians came to see (private) property rights as the 
basis for liberty overall, Rothbard did an excellent job in describing how property 
rights are the origin of all other rights:  
 
„In the profoundest sense there are no rights but property rights … there are 
several senses in which this is true. In the first place, each individual, as a 
natural fact, is the owner of himself, the ruler of his own person. Then „human‟ 
rights of the person that are defended in the purely free-market society are, in 
effect, each man‟s property right in his own being, and form this property 
right stems his right to the material goods that he has produced.  
In the second place, alleged “human rights” can be boiled down to property 
rights … for example the “human rights” of free speech. Freedom of speech is 
supposed to mean to mean the right of everyone to say whatever he likes. But 
the neglected question is: Where? (…) [C]ertainly not on property on which he 
is trespassing. In short he has this right only either on his own property or on 
the property of someone who has agreed, as a gift or in a rental contract, to 
allow him on the premises. In fact then, there is no such thing as a separate 
“right to free speech”; there is only a man‟s property right: the right to do as 





Rothbard‟s message is clear: if one thinks liberty is the most fundamental right there 
is, this means that we should be able to do as we want. And that, in itself, means that 
we should have the opportunity to do so with various parts of ourselves. Moreover, it 
is not doing what we want with anything else unless we have in some way acquired 
the right so to do.
22
 
These words are right, assuming a person is the owner of his own body and 
goods he appropriated with this body. With Hoppe, I think this assumption is correct, 
because if a person were not the owner of his own body and the places and goods 
originally appropriated and/or produced with this body as well as owner of the goods 
voluntarily (contractually) acquired from another previous owner, then only two 
alternatives would exist: either another person should be considered the owner, or 
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both persons must be equal co-owners of all this.
23
 The first option reminds us of 
slavery and I think the ethic universal unacceptability does not need further 
explanation. The second option might indeed mean that there is an equal law for 
everyone, but this theoretical situation is impossible to work out in real life. It would 
mean that all goods were co-owned by everyone.  
 
„No one, at no time and no place, would be allowed to do anything unless he 
had previously secured every other co-owner‟s consent to do so. Yet how 
could anyone grant such consent were he not the exclusive owner of his own 
body (including his vocal chords) by which means his consent must be 
expressed. Indeed, he would first nee another‟s consent in order to be allowed 
to express his own, but these others could not give their consent without 





2.3 Practical issues of private property 
 
Unlike the three classes of property Nozick came up with, modern times saw theorists 
inventing different classifications. Libertarian law-theorist Richard Epstein divides 
property into the following three central features: exclusion, use and disposition. 
Exclusion is the first great objective of social order: the separation of the owner from 
everyone else. The advantage in a social context is that it is scalable. Ownership also 
includes the right to use property. An owner has the right to transform, develop, 
consume or dispose of his property. Epstein describes the third feature, disposition, as 
the right to sell or give away property, during life or at death, from one person to 
another.
25
 However, he also adds remarks regarding the downside of private property. 
Regarding exclusion, it can be said that these rights work well when those excluded 
have other choices. No problems arise when competitive markets provide for the same 
(type of) property, but troubles will occur when there is no alternative to the property 
owner. Furthermore, because use and exclusion come together in this point of view, in 
most cases it is efficient to assign the single owner exclusive right to use for each 
piece of property. However, exclusive use is not the same as unlimited use of 
property. So Epstein concludes, „Every legal system has to decide how to limit one 
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person‟s use of his rights in order to protect his neighbour‟s. The challenge is to create 
a common regime that will maximize the value of the individual holdings, which 
happens only when restrictions on use cost each owner less than the benefits they 
afford his neighbours.‟
26
 To continue with Epstein‟s example of neighbors: one can 
easily imagine obvious limits to the rights of the individual where they encroach on 
the rights of others (do not trespass on the land of your neighbor, do not build 
structures that overhang you neighbor‟s land), but one can also easily imagine 
circumstances for which limits are less easily defined. Examples of this kind of 
nuisance are production of loud noises or practices that cause unpleasant smells. 
Limits for this type of nuisance are far more arbitrary.  
Similar difficulties can – often more easily – apply to the right of disposition. 
First, incorrect descriptions of property can make the simplest of contracts fail. 
Besides that, parties can take advantage of one and other using duress, fraud or 
concealment. Moreover, a contract between A and B regarding property, may 
generate harmful consequences to third persons. For example, business agreements 
are often said to cause monopoly power and enhance economic efficiency. According 
to Epstein, in this particular situation, „[t]he proper response may be to ban the 
combination or merger, or to allow it to go forward subject to limitations on rates. But 
however difficult it is to combat collusion, one point remains clear: the state should 
never use force to restrict competition in the open market.‟
27
 I do not wish to discuss 
different opinions on these particular examples in this chapter, but I believe that 
Epstein comes up with useful cases of every-day problems that highlight the 
difficulties that can occur within property law-theory (hence his terminology 
“downside of private property”). 
 
 
2.4 The classical approach: economics of private property  
 
Libertarians do not only think that the idea of private property aligns with moral 
intuitions and therefore is the solution to the problem of social order; they also believe 
it should be seen as the basis for social welfare, through economic prosperity. In this 
                                                 
26
 Epstein 2008 p.23 
27












paragraph I will make clear how laissez-faire theorists link private property to liberty 
in a free market.  
An important (scientifically accepted) approach to the improvement of social 
welfare is the so-called Pareto-efficiency, named after Italian economist Vilfredo 
Pareto. This theory asserts that given a set of alternative allocations, say money or 
goods, a change from one allocation to another that can make at least one individual 
better off without making any other individual worse off means a(n) (Pareto) 
improvement. Let us analyze private property in the light of the Pareto-criterion, 
based on the possible action undertaken with (appropriated or produced) property. 
The act of original appropriation meets the requirement of the Pareto-criterion. 
One person, the appropriator, increases his welfare by “mixing his labor” with it, 
while no other person‟s physical wealth is diminished. Others maintain the same level 
of property as before, and the appropriator gains new, previously non-existent 
property. It seems clear that the act of original appropriation always increases social 
welfare. 
What can we say about any further action with these goods and territories? 
The liberal view is that no matter what a person does with his property, he chooses to 
do so in order to increase his welfare. Whether he consumes or decides to produce 
new property out of “nature,” it enhances social welfare. An act of production is 
motivated by the desire of the producer to increase the value of the entity, and thus, 
social welfare. The only requirement is that the consumption or production does not 
lead to physical damage or diminution of property owned by others. When we have a 
look at the transfer of appropriated goods, we see that an exchange of property is only 
possible if the owners are convinced that what they acquire has more value to them 
than what they give up. Naturally, when two persons gain in welfare from every 
exchange of property, and the property under the control of everyone else is 
unchanged, we can conclude that every voluntary transfer of appropriated or produced 
property from one owner to another increases social welfare. 
Considering the mentioned fulfillment of the Pareto-criterion in every possible 
action concerning appropriated property, Hoppe concludes: „[i]n distinct contrast, any 
deviation from the institution of private property must lead to social welfare loss.‟
28
 
Hoppe also adds that this is not a particularly new point of view. It is a „classic theory 
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of private property, based on self-ownership, original appropriation (homesteading), 
and contract (title transfer)‟ that was being used for centuries before libertarians such 





2.5 Comparison to the Chicago approach 
 
Economists and legal theorists in association with the University of Chicago have 
provided a significant number of publications in which the classical, economic 
approach to private property is criticized. Important writers such as Ronald Coase, 
Harold Demsetz and Richard Posner put forward ideas that contest the classical 
“solution” of first appropriation. The Chicagoan views are not completely the same, 
but have enough commonalities to be considered as one school of thought for the 
purposes of this paper. To illustrate the differences between the classic and Chicagoan 
views , I use an example articulated by libertarian Walter Block: 
 
„Let us suppose that the damage to a farmer's crops from a neighboring factory 
amounts to $100,000; that there is no way that the farmer himself can prevent 
the damage to his crops; that bargaining transactions between the farmer and 
the manufacturer are costless; that changes in the distribution of wealth 
between them can be ignored; and finally, that the manufacturer can stop the 





While, according to the classic point of view, there is a need to establish who was 
there first (the farmer or the factory) in order to judge a conflict like this, Chicagoans 
have a different point of view. The answer, primarily structured by Coase, is twofold. 
First, and positively, he states that it does not matter how property rights and liability 
are allocated as long as they are allocated and provided that there are no transaction 
costs. Neither the farmer nor the factory is wrong or right, but rather what needs to be 
solved is the fact that the factory negatively affects the farmer and thus what needs to 
be decided is how to restrain the factory.  
Looking at the allocation of economic resources in this problem, we can say 
the following: if the factory is found liable for the crop damage, they will install an 
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SPD for $75,000, or take measures to cease operations that cause the damage. If the 
factory is found not liable, then the farmer will pay a sum between $75,000 and 
$100,000 to install an SPD. This means both situations result in a solution of the 
conflict. But as Hoppe (handling a comparable example) mentions correctly, in an 
inverse situation (the costs of crop loss is $75,000 and the costs of the installation of 
an SPD are $100,000) an SPD will never be installed. Because if the factory is found 
liable it will cover the farmer‟s loss, but not install an SPD, and if the factory is found 
not liable, the farmer is unable to pay the factory enough to install the SPD. 
„Therefore, regardless of how property rights are initially assigned, according to 
Coase, Demsetz, and Posner the allocation of production factors will be the same.‟
31
 
Second, and normatively, the Chicagoans argue that courts should assign 
property rights to the contesting parties in such a way that “wealth” or the “value of 
production” is maximized. This means that judges should always rule in favor of the 
solution that costs less money. So if we look at Block‟s example, the factory will be 
found liable because the costs of an SPD are not as high as the farmer‟s loss. 
Libertarians agree that both the positive and the normative claim of the 
Chicagoans must be rejected. They think that it surely does matter to the farmer and 
the factory to whom the property rights are assigned. The most important reason for 
this is the problem of knowledge, in slightly different areas. For the value of social 
production, it does matter how property rights are assigned. Resources allocated to 
productive ventures are not simply given; they are rather the outcome of previous acts 
of appropriation and production themselves. According to Hoppe and Block, only if 
appropriators and producers are the absolute owners of their goods, will the level of 
welfare be maximized, and not with a judicial decision afterwards.  
Besides that, how should a judge decide if the farmer‟s loss would not be the 
crops he was going to sell, but the (for other people nearly worthless) flowers he and 
his wife enjoy looking at every day? If the factory is found not liable, the farmer 
would probably still not be able to come up with the funds to install the SPD.  
With regard to the normative claim of the Chicagoans, the libertarian answer is 
that any interpersonal comparison of utility is scientifically impossible. Arbitrary 
assumptions will lead to even more arbitrary cost-benefit analyses. In addition, the 
difficulties arising because of arbitrary assumptions will lead to great uncertainty 
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about property-titles. Fluctuating market-data creates different circumstances, and the 
re-distribution of property will be necessary. This is considered to be unjust and, from 
an economic standpoint, terribly inconvenient. Block concludes that the Chicagoan 
approach is „plain downright immoral. It‟s evil and vicious to violate our most 
cherished and precious property rights in an ill conceived attempt to maximize the 
monetary value of production.‟
32
 I want to end this chapter by citing Hoppe, who 
expresses himself in a more nuanced way, very representative of the libertarian idea:  
 
„No one can determine ex ante whether or not his actions will lead to social 
wealth maximization. If this can be determined at all, it can only be 
determined ex post. Nor does anyone have control over whether or not his 
actions maximize social wealth. Whether or not they do depends on others‟ 
actions and evaluations. Again, who in his right mind would subject himself to 
the judgment of a court that did not let him know in advance how to act justly 








The basic concept of property from a libertarian point of view is scarcity. Goods are 
not available in superabundance and thus there needs to be a system to assign them to 
individuals. John Locke‟s approach of mixing labor in order to appropriate goods is 
the foundation of the laissez-faire view on private property. The pure libertarian idea 
is that while considering the possessions of ourselves, there are no rights but property 
rights. 
 Different libertarians have different ideas when it come to the practical issues 
of private property rights, because clearly the major dilemma concerns where a legal 
system ought to draw the lines to limit one person‟s use of his rights in order to 
protect the rights of another individual. As will be explained later, this also is a key 
concern in intellectual property rights discussions.  
 The first approach to resolve friction in private property issues is the classical 
approach that uses the logic of the Pareto-efficiency. Motivated by desire to increase 
(individual) social welfare, owners will transfer appropriated goods if they are 
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convinced that what they acquire has more value to them than what they give up. In a 
negative approach to this statement, it is even said that any deviation from the 
institution of private property must lead to social welfare loss. 
 The liberal counterpart of the classical approach is the Chicago approach. 
Unlike the libertarian way of assessing who is the first appropriator and how that 
individual acts to improve his welfare, Chicagoans mainly use an approach of 
financial allocation to maximize wealth and value of production. Libertarian criticism 
of this approach is that this is scientifically impossible. In their eyes, arbitrary 
assumptions will lead to even more arbitrary analyses, which is immoral and 












3 Intellectual property law theories 
 
Now that I have made clear what the general libertarian view on law, government and 
economy is, and what this means for libertarian thoughts on private property, it is time 
to let the laissez-faire views rest for a while, and pay more attention to the field of law 
that is essential to this thesis: intellectual property (IP). In this chapter, I wish to 
deliberate on the theory of IP law. I will discuss the foundations of the type of law in 
practice all over the world today.  
To explain the application of the theories, it is helpful to briefly analyze the 
four specific modes of IP (patents, copyrights, trademarks and trade secrets), as the 
criticism that I wish to review later in this thesis, as well as the South African issues 
concerning IP rights, is often addressed to (a) specific form(s) of intellectual property.  
It is found that the arguments for the current valid regulations are mainly 
found in the utilitarian theory. However, there are more theories of IP law that lead to 
a similar approach of regulation, and these are based on the natural law approach (i.e. 
John Locke‟s provisions). The Lockean view is a very important one for the aim of 
this thesis, because almost all libertarian supporters and libertarian opponents of 
intellectual property ultimately root their arguments in his statements regarding 
property. I will handle Locke‟s theory intensively, but save the depth of the libertarian 
discussion for the next chapter.  
The Lockean view on IP law is not the only way to apply the natural rights 
doctrine to intellectual property. I will also discuss a theory that is based on the 
“personality”-views of Georg Hegel (and Emmanuel Kant), which have a different 
approach, but quite a similar practical outcome in their argumentations. 
 
 
3.1 Intellectual property regulation 
 
A convenient way to begin looking at worldwide usage of IP regulations is to analyze 
the Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) agreement, which 
is an important pillar of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The WTO presumably 
exists to increase world economic welfare, which means that its rules and processes 












achieve or claim to achieve that end.
34
 Every one of the 153 member countries of the 
WTO is obligated to sign this agreement, which means they must have TRIPS-
compatible IP regulation. The preamble of the TRIPS agreement states that the 
members desire to reduce distortions and impediments to international trade, and take 
into account the need to promote effective and adequate protection of intellectual 
property rights, and wish to ensure that measures and procedures to enforce 
intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers to legitimate trade.
35
 
This says more about the will to reduce trade barriers caused by different intellectual 
property regulations than it does represent the justification member states have for 
their intellectual property laws in the first place. Nevertheless, it creates a huge 
restriction of the freedom of states to shape their IP legislation. This system ensures 
that the national regulations enact strong(er) protection for intellectual property. For 
example, under TRIPS: 
- Patents must be granted in all "fields of technology," and at least for 20 years 
(article 33). Although exceptions for certain public interests are allowed.  
- Copyright must be granted automatically, and not based upon any "formality", 
and the terms must extend to 50 years after the death of the author. (Article 
12) 
- Computer programs shall be protected in the same way as "literary works" 
under copyright law. (Article 10) 
- An extensive protection of geographic indications is covered. This 
comprehends characteristics of the good that are essentially attributable to the 
geographical origin of a member state. (Article  22) 
- Exceptions to the exclusive rights must be limited, provided that a normal 
exploitation of the work (Art. 13) and normal exploitation of the patent 
(Art 30) is not in conflict. 
 
Article 7 of the TRIPS agreement states the objective that should be implied in 
national legislations:  
 
The protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights should 
contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the transfer 
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and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and 
users of technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and 
economic welfare, and to a balance of rights and obligations. 
 
The main reason for unification of IP rights may be to eliminate trade barriers, but it 
gives us an overview of the structure of the IP legislation in the WTO member states 
(despite the usage of exceptions). Apparently, the objective of the regulations 
themselves is contribution to the promotion of innovation to enable producers and 
knowledge-users to benefit. We will find out that this description is based on the 
utilitarian theory, but also fits into the doctrine of approaches that are based on the 
natural rights-theory. I wish to discuss which theory or theories are represented by the 
(non-trade related) objectives of the TRIPS agreement and, thus, worldwide IP 
regulation. However, it is useful to pay more attention to the different modes of 
intellectual property as we know them in present IP laws. 
 
 
3.2 The modes of intellectual property 
 
The different modes of IP rights have different legal and economic backgrounds. To 
give an overview of the basic patent, trademark, copyright and trade secret law, the 
reader should keep in mind that where I become more detailed, I deal with a focus on 
United States law. The reason for this approach is the sheer volume of US-based 
literature in the field of IP law, but more important: in libertarian writings. However, 
the laws of other countries will be examined when showing significant differences 
from US legislation. I shall describe the legal rights in the particular field of law, 
followed by the standard economic justifications.  
 
 
3.2.1 Patents  
 
An invention falls within the scope of patentable subject matter when it concerns a 
machine, process, manufacture or composition of matter, and when it meets the 
following three statutory criteria: novelty, utility, and nonobviousness.
36
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protection is not available for laws of nature, natural phenomena and abstract ideas. 
The novelty requirement is normally satisfied as long as the patent applicant was the 
first to invent the claimed invention. The utility condition requires that the invention 
works and that it serves some minimal human need. An invention is too obvious if the 
differences between the claimed invention and the relevant prior art are such that the 
claimed invention would have been “obvious at the time the invention was made to a 
person having ordinary skill in the art to which the subject matter pertains.” In most 




 Once a US patent is granted, the patentee may exclude others from using the 
invention (in many ways) in the United States for a term ending twenty years from the 
date on which the application was filed.
38
 If the owner of the patent suspects that 
someone is making, using, or selling without permission, she can file suit for patent 
infringement. 
In their economic and legal analysis of IP rights and remedies, Blair and 
Cotter describe the reasoning of the patent system as follows:  
 
„The fundamental premise of the patent system is that society benefits when 
people conceive of new inventions; develop and commercialize new products 
incorporating those inventions (a process referred to as innovation, as distinct 
from invention); a publicly disclose information about their inventions, so that 




They add that most people probably agree with this premise, but that obviously the 
difficult question is how to optimize these social benefits, or, more precisely, the 
surplus of social benefits over social costs. As we will see, this question of policy is a 
crucial aspect in the (libertarian) discussion regarding IP rights. 
 
 
3.2.2 Trade secrets 
 
Trade secret protection is different than patent law, especially because it is much 
easier to obtain. Under the US Uniform Trade Secret Act, any information that 
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provides a person with a competitive advantage as long as it remains secret is 
potentially protectable as a trade secret. Because the stringent novelty and 
nonobviousness conditions of patent law do not apply, unpatentable items can still 
qualify as trade secrets. Trade secret protection may be easier to obtain, the downside 
is that it is more vulnerable to forfeiture. The owner may exclude another from, 
among other things, acquiring the secret by “improper means” such as theft or 
espionage, or through another person who had “improper means” or a duty to 
maintain secrecy.
40
 However, often every way that an owner can lose his trade secret 
will give the owner the right of recourse under other (criminal or civil) laws. Besides 
that, „unlike a patentee, the trade secret owner has no recourse against independent 
discovery or reverse engineering. Moreover, trade secret protection lasts only for as 
long as the information remains secret and valuable.‟
41
 
 Regarding the reasoning behind trade secret law, this departure from patent 
law has two advantages: first, it supplements the patent system, because it provides an 
incentive to develop information that has some social value, though not enough to 
warrant a patent. Second, it arguably discourages socially wasteful measures to 
protect the secrecy of one‟s invention, since “normal” reasonable precautions are less, 







„Copyright laws protect virtually all “original works of authorship,” including literary, 
musical, dramatic, and choreographic works; pictorial graphic, and sculptural works; 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works; architectural works; and, in the United 
States and some other countries, sound recordings.‟
43
 The originality criterion is not 
hard to fulfill. US jurisprudence shows that “originality” means only that the work 
exhibit independent creation and some minimal degree of creativity either in the 
expression of underlying facts or ideas or in the selection or arrangement of those 
facts.
44
 However, a very important addition for the purpose of this thesis is that ideas 
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and facts themselves are not subject to protection. The thin line between protectable 
expression, selection or arrangement and unprotectable ideas or facts can raise 
difficulties. Besides that, it is not hard to imagine how arbitrarily and vague courts‟ 
findings are to conclude that an accused work is “substantially similar” to the 
complainant‟s work. Blair and Cotter explain how copyright law admits many more 
exceptions than patent law: 
 
„There is, first, a first-sale or exhaustion doctrine, similar to what we find in 
patent law, which permits the owner of a lawfully made copy to distribute and 
display that copy without permission of the copyright owner. Second, a variety 
of limited exceptions apply only to certain works or certain uses; many of 
these provisions of the U.S. Copyright Act tend to be highly technical. Third, 
the United States recognizes the fair use defence, an open-ended exception 





Just like patent law, the reasoning of copyright regulations is found in an incentive 
and a prospect-like function. 
 
„The incentive theory suggests that, in the absence of copyright protection, the 
number of works created and published would be less than optimal due to the 
ability of others to free-ride upon the efforts of creators and publishers and 
thereby prevent them from recouping their investments in creation and 
publication. (…) The prospect theory suggests that according ownership rights 
in all of the various uses for any given copyrighted work will maximize social 




As this is not the place to discuss them, suffice it to say that there are different forms 
of criticism of these theories. However, in this chapter the general basis of the theories 





The last source of intellectual property I wish to cover is the field of trademarks. Any 
symbol that identifies a unique product or service can be a trademark. The most 
obvious forms are words, but trademark rights can subsist in pictures, numbers, 
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letters, or even colors or fragrances. In the US, use of a trademark is usually a 
prerequisite to protection: the first person to make a lawful, commercial use of a 
symbol to identify her product or service acquires a trademark right by operation of 
law. In other countries however, a person acquires a trademark right through 
registration, although subsequent use of the mark within a specified period of time is 
usually necessary to keep the registration in force.
47
 
 Trademarks differ from patents and copyrights, because their protection is 
based on the law of unfair competition. The ownership of a trademark gives the owner 
the right to exclude others from the commercial use of a mark that is likely to cause 
confusion with the owner‟s mark as to the source or sponsorship of parties‟ goods or 
services.
48
 The second right is only applicable to famous, highly distinctive rights. It 
is the right to prevent trademark dilution, which is the lessening of the capacity of a 
mark to identify a unique product or service.
49
 Its aim is to prevent this use, which 
would diminish the value of the mark. 
 Blair and Cotter name four economic functions trademarks serve: first, they 
lower search costs by allowing consumers to distinguish between products that differ 
in quality but that, in the absence of differing brand names, would be difficult or 
impossible to distinguish at the point of purchase. Second, and closely related to this 
argument, it encourages producers to invest in quality control or, more broadly, the 
development of the consumer goodwill that trademarks symbolize. Third (but more 
controversial), the quality of trademarks that may be more relevant to the antidilution 
cause of action is the ability of trademarks to serve as vehicles for persuasive 
advertising. The last (and by far most controversial) function is to promote 
monopolistic competition by encouraging consumers to perceive differences among 
products that are not, in any meaningful sense, distinct.
50
  
 One could say that trademarks get special attention from the critics. Because 
of their competition law-basis, trademarks are afforded legal protection that differs 
from the other fields of intellectual property. Moreover, in my opinion it is the mode 
of IP which it is the most difficult to support with (incentive) arguments using the 
utilitarian theory, as we will find out later in this chapter. 
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3.3 Intellectual property theory 
 
It is not surprising that intellectual property right theories are classified differently by 
different writers. However, in analyzing these classifications one will be able to make 
a distinction between the broad, general theories. 
In his contribution to the Encyclopedia of Law and Economics, Peter Menell 
divides the IP theories into the utilitarian, and non-utilitarian arguments. Among the 
many – though very briefly discussed – non-utilitarian theories mentioned by Menell, 
are John Locke‟s natural rights/labor theory, and the personhood theory introduced by 
Emmanuel Kant and Georg Hegel.
51
 Menell also covers the libertarian view on IP 
rights, but his work does little more than to tell us that the libertarians base their views 
on some of the above-mentioned theories, refer to several libertarian writers – which I 
will discuss in upcoming chapters – and conclude with the statement that „liberty 
interests do not decisively cut in just one direction.‟
52
 
 In 2001, William Fisher published an article in which he condensed the 
different theories of intellectual property into four approaches. Fisher too, starts with 
the most popular utilitarian theory, and follows Menell in his attention paid to Locke‟s 
labor theory and Hegel‟s personality approach. He adds a fourth theory to the 
spectrum: the social planning theory. An approach „very similar to utilitarianism in its 
teleological orientation, but dissimilar in its willingness to deploy visions of a 
desirable society richer than the conceptions of “social welfare” deployed by 
utilitarians.‟
53
 Fisher‟s intention in this article is to compare the theories. Hence, 
unlike Menell, he pays the same amount of attention to all of the theories.  
 In my opinion, for the purpose of this thesis, the difference between the social 
planning-idea of a desirable society and the utilitarian wish of social welfare is not 
particularly relevant. For that reason, I wish to use this paragraph to garner insight 
into how the combination of the utilitarian argument and the natural law approaches 
(labor and personality theory) resulted in the IP legislation we know today. 
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3.3.1 Utilitarian theory 
 
The aim of using the utilitarian or economic theory of IP law in legislation is to 
maximize, for the whole of society, the welfare that is being created by innovations. 
In his writings on general theories of intellectual property, Menell states the following 
about the utilitarian argument: 
 
„The social value of utilitarian works lies principally if not exclusively in their 
ability to perform tasks (for example, a better mousetrap) or satisfy desires 
more effectively or at lower costs. It is logical, therefore, that society would 
seek to protect such works within a governance regime that itself is based 
upon utilitarian precepts. Furthermore, inventions – new processes, machines, 
manufactures, or compositions of matter – unlike artistic or literary expression 




The doctrine of the economic case for, for example, patent protection is quite simple. 
In his contribution to The Intellectual Property Debate Brian Hindley calls it an 
exercise in second-best economics: „the best available option when, for some reason, 
the absolute best cannot be achieved. There are in fact two economic arguments for a 
patent system: one applying when the nature of an invention can be kept secret and 
the other when it cannot. The latter is the more important case in the modern world, 
and also the one that has more in common with other intellectual property.‟
55
 
 Hindley means that an IP system is mostly required in situations where the 
nature of the inventions cannot be kept secret. Inventors are likely to encounter 
difficulty in obtaining a return on resources they invest in their projects. „[I]n the 
absence of a patent system, the socially valuable activity of invention is likely to be 




 Utilitarian theory went through significant development during the last few 
centuries. William Landes and Richard Posner (both important supporters of the 
Chicago School) are responsible for relevant and recent work in which they use 
arguments brought up by Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill and Arthur Pigou. The 
first theorists responsible for the utilitarian body of thought were philosophers 
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Bentham and Mill. Mill adjusts the “happiness-principle,” introduced by Bentham. In 
his work Utilitarianism, Mill describes this perspective in the following way: „The 
creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness 
Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended 
pleasure, and the absence of pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of 
pleasure.‟
57
 Pleasure and pain are not only meant in a physical way, but intellectual as 
well. So the protection of intellectual property rights is designed to create general 
happiness by allowing the inventor or creator to profit from his effort.  
 To defend this theory, an advocate of the utilitarian IP theory should hold that 
society benefits from inventions in the first place. After all, isn‟t it obvious that there 
are also many inventions that are harmful, and should society put in the effort to 
protect these ideas? And what about books and art?  
 When it comes to patents (on inventions) the answer to this question lies in 
evolutionary development. „Secondary inventions – including essential design 
improvements, refinements, and adaptations to a variety of uses – are often as crucial 
to the generation of social benefits as the initial discovery. (…) Many studies 
emphasize the critical importance of linking innovation with understanding of 
consumer needs and astute marketing.‟
58
 Regarding copyrights (on arts, for example), 
the answer must be found in another way. What Menell argues regarding secondary 
inventions is less imaginable for art. In an article in which Posner compares the pure 
economic approach with the economic analysis of law-view, he states the following 
about what he calls “derivative works”:  
 
„A possible economic justification for the law's different treatment is that 
technological improvement is typically a continuous, collaborative process, 
and allowing unauthorized improvers to patent their improvements encourages 
maxi-mum participation in efforts to improve the originally patented process 
or product. Progress is much less pronounced in the arts; we do not think that 
after Shakespeare wrote each of his plays, other playwrights would have been 
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But when we reevaluate Mills‟ happiness-approach of utility, the answer should 
probably be found in the explanation that as long as the arts do not hurt society (a 
standard that is impossible to measure), they are a benefit to it. When you look at 
them as a complex of opportunities of experience (Mill also uses the word “quality”), 






3.3.2 Natural rights arguments 
 
The labor-theory and the personhood-theory can both be seen as a natural rights 
argument in favor of intellectual property protection. Locke bases his defense in labor, 
Hegel bases it in personality, and they are both used as an argument for the existence 
and interpretation of present IP laws.  
According to Fisher, besides the utilitarian argument, until recently, the labor 
theory was commonly used in the United States, while the European judges explained 
IP law more often using the personality-approach. The reason for this is the influence 
that Kant and Hegel had in – particularly – the German and French law systems. Over 
the last decades, American lawmakers became more familiar with this “moral rights-
doctrine” and it plays a larger part in US IP legislation. I wish to discuss solely the 
doctrine of both theories and how they are important in current policy. It is no surprise 
that virtually all of the libertarian supporters and opponents of intellectual property – 
who I will handle in the next chapter – use the Lockean theory as a starting point. I 
have already discussed Locke‟s theory on property. In this chapter, I will pay closer 
attention to the intellectual property aspects of his IP approach. 
  
 
3.3.2.1 Hegel’s personality doctrine 
 
Briefly, the personality theory of intellectual property law is derived from the opinion 
that private property rights are crucial to the satisfaction of some fundamental human 
needs. Fisher describes the task of the authorities in light of this theory as the duty to 
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allocate entitlements to resources in the fashion that best enables people to fulfill 
those needs.  
 
„[I]ntellectual property rights may be justified either on the ground that they 
shield from appropriation or modification artifacts through which authors and 
artists have expressed their “wills” (an activity thought central to 
“personhood”) or on the ground that they create social and economic 
conditions conducive to creative intellectual activity, which in turn is 




In his political work Philosophy of Right, Hegel ventilates his views on abstract rights 
(such as property and contract), morality and the ethical system. Based on the article 
„The Philosophy of Intellectual Property‟ written by Justin Hughes in 1988 in which 
he extracted an overview of Hegel‟s guidelines concerning the proper shape of a 
system of intellectual property, Fisher summarized this Hegelian system as following: 
 
„(a) We should be more willing to accord legal protection to the fruits of 
highly expressive intellectual activities, such as the writing of novels, than to 
the fruits of less expressive activities, such as genetic research. (b) Because a 
person‟s “persona” – his “public image, including his physical features, 
mannerisms, and history” – is an important “receptacle for personality,” it 
deserves generous legal protection, despite the fact that ordinarily it does not 
result from labor. (c) Authors and inventors should be permitted to earn 
respect, honor, admiration, and money from the public by selling or giving 
away copies of their works, but should not be permitted to surrender their right 




To compare this with Locke‟s views, one needs to see that this Hegelian system has 
its grounds in his basis for appropriation. Hegel‟s opinion is that „a person has the 
right to direct his will upon any object, as his real and positive end. The object thus 
becomes his. As it has no end in itself, it receives its meaning and soul from his will. 
Mankind has the absolute right to appropriate all that is a thing.‟
63
 So property is 
derived from a person‟s natural right to “put his will into a thing” and make is his. 
The difference with Locke is the basis of this natural right of appropriation: will 
instead of labor. In Hegel‟s own words, this means the following for the multiplying 
of literary works:  
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„Since the purchaser of such a product of mental skill possesses the full use 
and value of his single copy, he is complete and free owner of that one copy, 
although the  author of the work or the inventor of the apparatus remains 
owner of the general method of multiplying such products. The author or 





Thus, according to Hegel, when the users of intellectual property pay for this use, it is 
an act of recognition (as a person), a non-economic form of respect for the “owner” 
that has the same objective as the economic reward. For this justification of alienation, 
Hughes argues that two criteria are essential: the creator of the work must receive 
public identification, and the work must receive protection against any changes 
unintended or unapproved by the creator.
65
 The IP legislation we know takes care of 




3.3.2.2 Locke’s labor theory 
 
Where supporters of Locke think that property proceeds from labor, it seems likely 
that one‟s mental labor can also be the basis for appropriation. When someone has 
property in his own person (self-ownership) and he can make something his property 
by mixing his labor with it, this will work for mental labor too. Property does not have 
to be the work of one‟s hand, otherwise a person who works with his feet, teeth or 
another part of his body is not able to own his labor. Intellectual works develop from 
someone‟s mental labor, and will be expressed “outside” by means of labor of a 
person‟s body. The self-ownership doctrine of owning oneself and one‟s actions, 
combined with the labor-theory leads to an understandable argument in favor of 
intellectual property rights.  
However, to compare Locke‟s labor theory with the utilitarian view, we have 
to keep in mind that there are two important differences between intellectual property 
and tangible or physical property. First, as I explained in the beginning of chapter two, 
most tangible goods are rivalrous, which means that they can be consumed by only 
one person at a time, and this is not the case for intellectual works. For example, the 
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use of a computer program by one person does not exclude another person from use 
and enjoyment of the same program. The second major difference can be found in the 
availability for appropriation. In his defense of the Lockean theory of IP, Adam 
Moore uses the following words: „[w]hile all matter, owned or unowned, already 
exists, the same is not true of intellectual property. Putting aside platonic models (or 
discovery models), it seems that many intellectual works are created ex nihilio – from 
nothing.‟
66
 Moore means to say that the basis for appropriation of intellectual works is 
practically unlimited.  
 
„Moreover, since it is possible that two or more individuals can own the same 
intellectual work, we must include the set of privately owned intellectual 
works along with the practically infinite set of non-actual ideas or collections 
of ideas. Only the set of ideas that are in the public domain or those ideas that 





Then why do writers like Moore interpret Locke‟s works in such a way that it gives 
room for the worldwide IP practice we are dealing with today, in spite of the two 
differences that exist between intellectual and tangible/physical property? The answer 
is that the advocates only disagree with a limited part of the doctrine, rather than with 
the reason behind some of the rules. I wish to discuss this topic with a focus on 
Moore‟s argument in favor of the Lockean theory.  
 First, there is the distinction between idea and expression, which is not 
sustainable in light of the Lockean doctrine. Moore has problems with „the truism in 
copyright and patent law that you cannot protect an idea but only your expression or 
the physical embodiment of it‟, and he advocates a system in which ideas and their 
expression should not be separated but rather treated as a whole.
68
 The discussion 
about whether one can own and register an idea will be elaborated on in the following 
chapter.  
Another issue that causes friction is the free use zones of first sale or fair use. 
Except for musical recording and videos, an owner of a copy can do whatever he 
wants with the copy he acquired. This rule is based on the assumption „that we can 
distinguish between the owner of an intellectual work and the owner of the physical 
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embodiment of that intellectual work.‟
69
 This statement contains some overlap with 
the idea-expression distinction. According to Moore, and in contrast to the utilitarian 
view, granting authors and inventors control of expressions beyond the first sale 
would not diminish overall social utility and also would not reduce incentives.  
The final utilitarian idea that cannot be defended by a Lockean, is the view 
that there are limits on the rights of created, rather than discovered, intellectual 
property. To make clear what the argument of a Lockean might be regarding the 
limitations of these rights, Moore refers to Nozick:  
 
„[A] known inventor drastically lessens the chances of actual independent 
invention. For persons who know of an invention usually will not try to 
reinvent it, and the notion of independent discovery here would be murky at 
best. Yet we may assume that in the absence of the original invention, 
sometime later someone else would have come up with it. This suggests 
placing a time limit on patents, as a rough rule of thumb to approximate how 





Nozick (as a libertarian advocate of IP) will get more attention in the next chapter. For 
now, he describes the basis of Moore‟s disagreement with the separation of created 
and discovered rights. He calls this argument for limiting rights the “shadow of 
Locke‟s proviso.” „The proviso sanctions takings so long as others are not worsened. 
If opportunities are valuable, then as time passes the probability that some other 
inventor has been worsened with respect to a certain intellectual work grows.‟
71
 
Altogether, Moore draws the following conclusion: 
 
„There is no room in this account for the idea-expression distinction, the free 
use zones of first sale or fair use, and the limits on the rights of created, rather 
than discovered, intellectual property. While these changes may sound radical, 
upon adopting a Lockean model we will have good reason to believe that 
actual practices will not change much. What will have changed, however, is 
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I refer to Moore here because he explains how the present IP system – with some 
adjustments – can be advocated using Locke‟s labor theory. However, in this stage, 
the aim is to stress the different IP law theories that can be seen as the basis of the 
worldwide legislation we know (as a part of it is mentioned in TRIPS). That not 
everyone can see how Locke‟s views should lead to this IP protection system, is made 
clear by Fisher.  
 According to him, „it is not altogether clear that the labor theory supports any 
sort in intellectual property law. The source of the difficulty is the ambiguity in 
Locke‟s original rational for property rights – from which this entire theory springs.‟
73
 
Fisher questions why exactly labor upon a resource held “in common” should entitle 
the laborer to a property right in the resource itself. He claims to filter several 
different answers from Locke‟s work Two treatises of government, which lead to 
different conclusions and, thus, do not generate a unified view on IP law.
74
 The 
controversy explains the different views of intellectual property among the natural 






The TRIPS agreement shows us how far we are in the process of unification of 
intellectual property law. The aim might be the improvement of worldwide trade, but 
it leaves the WTO-states with a clear-cut system of strict IP regulation.  
 Looking at this system, we see the influence of the analyzed theories on 
legislation regarding copyrights, patents, trademarks and trade secrets. For the 
libertarian debate on IP, the primary focus will be copyrights and patents, because the 
other two are easier to justify as will appear later on. 
 The utilitarian theory of IP rights is based on the thought that society benefits 
from created works and inventions. The ultimate source of this view can be found in 
Mill‟s happiness-principle which holds that so long as an intellectual work does not 
hurt society, it is beneficial and the system should stimulate creators. 
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 The natural theory comes in two different forms: based on personhood (Hegel) 
and based on labor (Locke). We find Hegel in the middle of utilitarians (for the belief 
in “recognition” as a reward for creating works) and Lockeans (because Hegel states 
that an individual has a natural right to “put his will into a thing” and make is his). 
The difference between Hegel and Locke in that respect is that this natural right is 
based on will instead of labor. However, both of these founding fathers have “desert” 
as an important factor of their theory. To keep a proper separation between the 
proponents and opponents of IP rights, in the next chapter I will focus on utilitarians 












4 Libertarians on intellectual property 
 
Now that I have outlined the general libertarian theory, the general libertarian view on 
property, and the most important theories intellectual property law can be based on, I 
shall discuss the range of ideas regarding IP law that exist amongst libertarian 
theorists. The reason this is an interesting challenge is that there is not one obvious 
body of thought. Although all libertarians have the same (free market, free society) 
basis, they draw different conclusions when it comes to intellectual property, hence 
libertarian views range from full support of IP, to arguments in favor of complete 
abolition. Some supporters mainly base their opinion on the utilitarian theory, and 
even more use the natural rights arguments. The foundations of these doctrines I 
covered in the last chapter. 
It is worth mentioning that the discussion concentrates specifically on 
copyrights and patents, so that will be the focus in this chapter as well. The reason for 
this is that the general view of the laissez-faire theorists is that trademarks and trade 
secrets are not very problematic in the free market. Trade secrets are mainly seen as 
legitimate since it can be applied to a person who improperly acquires a trade secret, 
or a person who breaches a contact by divulging it. Trademarks are also considered 
acceptable, although the pure libertarian thinks that the consumer‟s rights are violated, 
rather than the company originally using the trademark.
75
 
Libertarians exchange the majority of their arguments through writings in 
legal and economic journals, often related to worldwide libertarian institutes and 
related gatherings. This global network of ideas is the reason that the communication 
between libertarian theorists concerning this particular topic often functions as a large 
dialogue. In works and journals, they refer to and answer each other‟s arguments. This 
creates valuable information for the purport of this essay on the one hand, but also 
makes it quite difficult to separate the distinct views without constantly referring to 
arguments made by the other party. The course of this chapter is based on this type of 
exchange of arguments, and as such I will fluctuate between the opinions of IP 
advocates and the counter-attacks of their opponents.  
First, I will discuss the arguments of the proponents of IP rights who base their 
views on the utilitarian theory, and how this causes friction with the anti-IP rights 
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libertarians. Then, I will do the same with regard to the proponents of IP rights who 
approve of copyright and patent protection based on the natural rights theory. Finally, 
I shall pay more attention to scarcity, the central focus of the antagonists of IP law, 
and the arguments of all parties regarding this topic. 
 
 
4.1 Discussing the utilitarian theory 
 
In 1989 Tom Palmer published an article titled „Intellectual Property: A Non-
Posnerian Law and Economics Approach,‟ in which he made clear why he does not 
believe that IP legislation is compatible with the libertarian body of thought. “Non-
Posnerian” relates to United States Federal Judge Richard Posner, who cannot be seen 
as a libertarian, but surely as an advocate of IP regulation from a utilitarian point of 
view. Palmer‟s position is described accurately by (pro-IP libertarian on utilitarian 
grounds) Ejan Mackaay, who summarized Palmer‟s ideas as follows:  
 
„1. Patent and copyright are not the product of an evolutionary process. Patent 
and copyright are not the result of an evolutionary process and require massive 
amounts of state intervention for their sustenance. Trademark and trade secrecy 
laws by contrast are legitimate products of such a process and have a different 
foundation. 
2. Patent and copyright have grown out of illegitimate privileges. Patent and 
copyright have grown out of privileges (monopolies) granted to manufacturers and 
printers rather than to inventors and authors. (The alleged unsavory origin of an 
institution does not, however, of itself entail its condemnation.) 
3. Patent and copyright are not species of property rights. “Patent and 




4. Rights cannot be created at will by the authorities. “Rights are not creations 
of the state, bestowed as gifts upon the people by wise and beneficent legislators, 
but simultaneously the spontaneous product and the ground (...) of the system of 
voluntary interactions we call the market.”
77
 This thesis is further articulated in a 
footnote quotation: “It is one thing to articulate an ex post property right 
interpretation of the mining district, the oil lease; (...) it is quite another to design 
ex ante property right institutions that will operate in the way we claim these 
„natural experiments' have operated.”
78
  
5. Patent and copyright must not be justified by appealing to (static) 
efficiency. Patent and copyright must not be justified by appealing to (static) 
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efficiency, as is proposed by Richard Posner. This reflects a constructivist or 
interventionist bias. The law is concerned with attributing rights rather than with 
the promotion of some social policy judged to be desirable. This criticism extends 
to Bentham and perhaps to all forms of utilitarianism. 
6. Our thinking faculties cannot be the object of exclusive rights. “[T]he right 
of a free exercise of our thinking faculties is given by nature to all mankind (...). 
[T]he mere fact that a given mode of doing a thing has been thought of by one, 
does not prevent the same ideas presenting themselves to the mind of another and 
should not prevent him from acting upon them.”
79
  
7. Spurs to innovation are present in the market, without state intervention. 
“Regimes that foster innovation and creativity can and do emerge through the 
market process without legislative or judicial intervention.”
80
  
8. The alleged “public good” character of information does not justify state 
intervention. The “public good” character of information, frequently invoked as 
reason for state intervention creating patent and copyright, is not an immutable 
fact of nature, but a drawback contingent upon the techniques available for 
curtailing free riding. It is a cost of producing information as it is a cost of 
property rights in physical commodities. Market forces, left to themselves, will 




Most of the anti-copyright and -trademark libertarians argue that the lack of scarcity 
in intellectual property is the main argument against IP legislation. The nature of 
economic goods involves choice, and scarcity and choice go hand in hand. Property is 
needed because (tangible) goods are scarce. If goods were available in 
superabundance, there would be no need for property, since conflict would not arise.  
 
„Intellectual property rights, however, do not rest on a natural scarcity of 
goods, but on an “artificial, self created scarcity.” That is to say, legislation or 
legal fiat limits the use of ideal objects in such a way as to create an artificial 




In his answer to Palmer, Mackaay pays attention to what drives a person to be 
innovative. Referring to Hayek and Israel Kirzner, he makes clear that a reward is an 
important, if not necessary condition for a substantial innovation. Regarding the 
matter of choice and economics, it is a fact that choice requires information as a major 
ingredient. The amount of information required is infinite. Moreover, transaction 
costs, the cornerstone of the economic analysis of law, are the result of imperfect 
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information, and these costs can be lowered by the availability of better information.
83
  
However, what do utilitarians think regarding the problems with exclusivity (which 




4.1.1 Rewards and contracts 
 
Regarding “realism in the law,” Mackaay‟s opinion is that „[i]n recognizing a property 
right in certain forms of information, the legislator complements what can be achieved 
by a simulated property right (practical exclusivity plus contracts with chain clauses) 
by adding the possibility of systematically ensuring exclusivity against third parties.‟
84
 
The anti-IP libertarians have the opinion that these simulated property rights are 
unnecessary, because these problems can be solved by personal contracts. The 
question is: how? Stephan Kinsella, author of the work Against Intellectual Property, 
explains IP as a possible contract. He and many other opponents of IP rights support 
„only contractual arrangements to protect ideas and innovations – private contracts 
between property owners.‟
85
 Patents and copyrights should be respected by all people, 
while a contract only binds the parties to the contract. To make clear how far contracts 
reach, Kinsella uses the example of a book publisher:  
 
„A writes a book and sells physical copies of it to numerous purchasers (…) 
with a contractual condition that each buyer B is obligated not to make or sell 
a copy of the text. Under all theories of contract, any of the buyers B becomes 
liable to A, at least for damages if he violates these provisions. (…) [T]he use 
of the contract only gets us so far. A book publisher may be able to 
contractually obligate his purchasers to not copy his book, but he cannot 





This basic view is convenient to assess the difficulties of the theory of contract. The 
next step Kinsella takes is the handling of “reservation of rights,” mentioned by what 
he calls “quasi-IP advocates.” This means that total property is seen as a divisible 
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bundle of rights and the owner sells under the reservation of some of these rights, so 
that „a type of “private IP” can be privately generated by creatively “reserving rights” 
to reproduce tangible items sold to purchasers.‟
87
 According to Kinsella, the problem 
that can be ascertained here is that an important function of property rights is lost, 
because the difference between goods with or without certain reserved rights is 
difficult, if not impossible to see: limiting the ability to prevent conflict and to put 
third parties on notice as to the property‟s boundaries. „Only if borders are visible can 
they be respected and property rights serve their function of permitting conflict-
avoidance. Only if these borders are both visible and objectively just (justifiable in 
discourse) can they be expected to be adopted and followed.‟
88
 
 In addition and closely related to this topic, Kinsella discusses “the right to 
remember.” Because when we take the example one step further, more vagueness 
shows up. Imagine A sells the book to B, who lends it to a third person, T1, who likes 
to read. T1 is learning the information contained in the book and teaches the content 
to another third party: T2. Neither T1 nor T2 has a contract with A, but both of them 
possess certain knowledge from the book. 
  
„Even if the book somehow does not contain within it a “right to reproduce,” 
how can this prevent T1 and T2 from using their own knowledge? And even if 
we say that T1 is somehow “bound” by a contractual copyright notice printed 





Anti-IP libertarians like Kinsella and Palmer think that ideas in someone‟s mind are 
not owned any more than labor is owned. Kinsella even criticizes famous libertarians 
for losing sight of scarcity as a necessary aspect of a homesteading thing, and of 
(Locke‟s) first occupancy homesteading rule as the way to own such property: 
„Rothbard and others are sidetracked into the mistaken notion that ideas and labor can 
be owned.‟
90
 So again, it comes down to the apparent misrecognition of scarcity and 
the fact that in the eyes of these libertarians only tangible resources can be owned. 
This view recognizes that it will never be possible for an inventor or artist to protect 
their works from third parties not bound by a contract. „The reserved right-approach 
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does not change this. Thus, it would probably be difficult to maintain anything similar 
to our present patent and copyright laws using contract alone.‟
91
 
 Pro-IP libertarians and their opponents like Kinsella do actually share the same 
visions regarding this aspect of copyrights and patents. The difference is that the 
utilitarians see this as a problem. When Mackaay analyzes the extent of the protection 
of information in safeguarding legal systems, he realizes that with “chain clauses” like 
the one Kinsella gives as an example, „one may attempt to extend contractual 
restrictions to third parties. The difficulty is, especially when one has to contract with 
a great many individuals, that the chain may be broken without the information 
“owner” being able to trace the source of the “leak.”‟
92
 Mackaay finishes his 
elucidation concerning “realism in the law” with the following statement:   
 
„[T]he possibility of systematically ensuring exclusivity against third parties] 
should be available only where a simulated right might be viable and (…) in 
all instances the interested parties must play an active role in the enforcement 
of exclusivity. For both patent and copyright, this test would be met. One can 
imagine copyrighted work and patented inventions being made available on 





According to Mackaay, copyrights and patents (simulated rights) are not problematic, 
as long as these rights are viable and proportionate. Referring to Hayek, he explains 
that over time, the reward structure that will prove most satisfactory to beneficiaries 
and patrons alike is one in which the relative remunerations that the individual can 
expect from the different uses of his abilities and resources correspond to the relative 
utility of the results of his efforts to others, and is a reward structure in which these 




We can conclude that the utilitarian view on this specific aspect is that a belief 
in the viability of the simulated rights (copyright and patents) combined with a useful, 
proportional remuneration creates space for a system that optimizes innovation and 
inventions where possible, instead of concluding that this is an unbalanced way of 
dealing with the libertarian body of thought, like their opponents state.  
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Anti-IP libertarians like Tom Bell express their critiques of the arbitrariness of 
this explanation. Besides the “unnaturalness” of copyrights and patents, which I shall 
discuss later in this chapter, Bell‟s opinion is that „[n]otwithstanding the ubiquitous 
claims that copyright and patent policy strikes a delicate balance between public and 
private rights, thus maximizing social utility, it almost certainly does not strike such a 
balance.‟
95
 The point is that even if political authorities could measure all the relevant 
(economic, legal, technological and cultural) factors in the light of intellectual 
property, they still would not be able to balance these values. This comment definitely 
represents the basis of the argument of free market-approach libertarians.  
However, not all laissez-faire theorists agree with the immeasurability of the 
benefits of copyrights and patents. David Friedman supports the utilitarian views of 
Mackaay, who also has the opinion that there are indeed certain models that show the 
benefits of a regulated IP system. Basing on the ideas of economist Edmund Kitch, 
Friedman states that there is proof of a positive development in innovation by offering 
the right coordination and protection:  
 
„[O]ne factor relevant to the value of intellectual property protection is the 
shape of the supply curve. Another factor is the need for coordination in 
production. As Edmund Kitch
96
 has pointed out, one function of intellectual 
property is to give the owner both the ability and the incentive to coordinate 
further developments within his “claim.” Where such coordination is 
important to the production of further intellectual property, intellectual 
property protection is more valuable than where development can proceed 




Friedman adds that another relevant factor is the availability of substitutes for legal 
protection, such as secrecy. „If denying legal protection to a particular sort of 
intellectual property results in the producer's substitution of equally effective but more 
costly alternatives, that is an argument in favor of providing legal protection.‟
98
 
 The discussion about the possibility of assessing these factors in the field of IP 
law, is a complicated one, and extremely economical. Numerous works have been 
written about the different economic approaches of intellectual property, but a 
detailed analysis of this topic surpasses the aims of this paper. However, we have 
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noted the basis of the disputes of this particular discussion between libertarians (the 
difference in belief in innovation and improving welfare without IP protection), and 
how the utilitarian libertarians advocate a slight sidestep from the pure libertarian idea 





There is another aspect that separates the utilitarian libertarians from other laissez-
faire theorists, closely related to the topic of the last subparagraph, that I wish to 
discuss as well. It is the matter of creating “artificial monopolies.” With the libertarian 
body of thought in the back of our minds, it is no surprise that these advocates of free 
markets see the creating of monopolies by state and law as something extremely 
antagonistic of the capitalistic view they share. It is a fact that all types of intellectual 
property have some measure of monopoly in them, since they guarantee exclusivity.  
About half of Palmer‟s remarks I quoted at the beginning of this chapter 
address the matter of the created monopoly, through what he calls illegitimate 
privileges and exclusive rights due to state intervention. Interestingly, Mackaay quite 
easily downplays this phenomenon by concluding that a patent (the best example for a 
monopoly) is just one of the elements used in competition. He also bases his views on 
Kitch‟s economic research, who‟s opinion is that the „ownership of patents is no 
different than the ownership of any other property right necessary as an input, and that 
we should no more assume that the owner of a patent is a monopolist than we should 
assume that the owner of particularly fertile land, especially productive skills, or of an 
advantageous location is a monopolist.‟
99
  “Clearly an extra value, but not nearly a 
monopoly,” seems to be the utilitarian opinion of Mackaay. Besides that, he explains 
that for a patent, the benefits in this area work stronger than for a copyright, which is 




 Kinsella‟s fundamental problem with this type of utilitarian criticism is that 
the law does not exist for wealth maximization: „rather, the goal is justice – giving 
each man his due. Even if overall wealth is increased due to IP laws, it does not 
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follow that this allegedly desirable result justifies the unethical violation of some 
individuals‟ rights to use their own property as they see fit.‟
101
 Therefore, in his eyes, 
whether it creates a full monopoly or not and whether it might or might not practically 
increase welfare, IP protection creates an unethical and thus unacceptable violation of 
individual rights. 
 In his conclusion, Mackaay stresses that he only disagrees with the first three 
statements his “opponent” Palmer made (patent and copyright are not the product of 
an evolutionary process, they have grown out of illegitimate privileges, and they are 
not species of property rights).
102
 The disagreements regarding the evolutionary 
process and the illegitimate privileges lead to the disputes about (un-)measurable 
welfare and the possible incentives to stimulate innovation and welfare, as well as the 
dilemma of an artificially created monopoly. The third point of controversy is one that 
suits the discussion that will be discussed in the next paragraph; whether (Locke‟s) 
natural rights theory is of the same importance in light of libertarianism when it 
concerns intellectual property. 
 
 
4.2 Discussing the theory of natural rights 
 
In chapter 3, I explained how writers have sought and found a way to explain the 
natural rights theory of liberal founding father John Locke in such a way that it 
applies to intellectual property as well. I want to clarify once more that Locke himself 
wrote hardly anything regarding IP rights.   
Some of the libertarian natural rights-based proponents of IP have specific 
views on the issue of creation. Ayn Rand, libertarian author of the work Capitalism, 
The Unknown Ideal is a supporter of IP rights and states the natural rights ratio as 
follows:  
 
„Patents and copyrights are the legal implementation of the base of all property 
rights: a man‟s right to the product of his mind. What the patent and copyright 
laws acknowledge is the paramount role of mental effort in the production of 
material values; these laws protect the mind‟s contribution in its purest form: 
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Legal theorist Epstein is more aloof in his opinion about the connection between 
(intellectual) property rights and liberty, but he also thinks that „the gulf between 
property rights in tangibles and property rights in intangibles is far narrower than 
these theorists [opposing copyrights] believe.‟
104
  
 In Anarchy, State and Utopia, Nozick pays some concise but influential 
attention to the connection between intellectual property and Locke‟s famous proviso, 
which is, briefly stated, the proposition that a person may legitimately acquire 
property rights by mixing his labor with resources held “in common” only if, after the 
acquisition, there is enough in common for others.
105
 According to Nozick, the correct 
interpretation of this limitation is that the acquisition of (intellectual) property through 
labor is legitimate only if other individuals do not suffer any net harm as a result. 
Fisher explains this terminology: 
 
„Net harm for these purposes includes such injuries as being left poorer than 
they would have been under a regime that did not permit the acquisition of 
property through labor or a constriction of the set of resources available for 
their use -- but does not include a diminution in their opportunities to acquire 




So consumers are helped, not hurt, by the assignment of a patent right to an inventor 
because even though other individuals‟ access to the invention is undoubtedly limited 
by this patent, without the efforts of the patent holder, the invention would not have 
existed at all.  
 
„Nozick contends, however, that fidelity to Locke's theory would mandate two 
limitations on the inventor's entitlements. First, persons who subsequently 
invented the same device independently must be permitted to make and sell it. 
Otherwise the assignment of the patent to the first inventor would leave them 
worse off. Second, for the same reason, patents should not last longer than, on 
average, it would have taken someone else to invent the same device had 
knowledge of the invention not disabled them from inventing it independently. 
Although Nozick may not have been aware of it, implementation of the first of 
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these limitations would require a substantial reform of current patent law -- 
which, unlike copyright law, does not contain a safe harbor for persons who 




Apparently, Nozick‟s direct application of Locke‟s proviso contains space for IP 
rights for two creators “dreaming up” the same work. 
Let us take a step back and connect Locke‟s natural rights theory to copyrights 
and patents, as I also covered in chapter 3. Briefly, the starting point for advocates of 
IP rights is that they are justified because 1) a creator owns himself, 2) he owns his 
labor, and 3) thus, he owns those intellectual properties with which, by dint of these 
creative acts, he mixes his labor.  
No libertarian will disagree with the statement that an individual owns himself 
and has the freedom to decide the use his own labor, so it is no wonder that the third 
point is the most controversial aspect. The critics of this justification think that 
copyright and patent protection actually contradict Locke‟s justification of property. 
While partly referring to Palmer, Bell paid some unambiguous attention to the 
“unnaturalness” of copyrights and patent rights:  
 
„By invoking state power, a copyright or patent owner can impose prior 
restraint, fines, imprisonment, and confiscation on those engaged in peaceful 
expression and the quiet enjoyment of their tangible property. Because it thus 
gags our voices, ties our hands and demolishes our presses, the law of 




Bell also thinks that, looking at the American system of IP protection, the reasons to 
support a system of IP rights by itself stand more in utility than natural rights. He 
argues that the argument for natural rights in copyrights and patents cannot claim the 
support of the US constitution, judicial interpretation, Locke‟s theory of property, or 
the Founders‟ views of copyrights and patents. „On that evidence I conclude that 
copyrights and patents represent notable exceptions to the default rule that a free 
people, resting common law rights and engaging in market transactions, can copy 
original expressions and novel inventions at will,‟
109
 Bell stresses. The fact that he 
believes to have proven that the original initiators of the US constitution nowhere 
defended the clause as a measure necessary to protect the natural rights of authors and 
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inventors, makes Bell convinced of the idea that „copyrights and patents are 




 Epstein does not agree with this. Firstly, he makes clear that these types of 
property are the result of pure labor, which, according to Locke‟s theory, the creator 
cannot keep because first possession of a tangible object allows him only to protect 
the paper on which the draft is written, rather than the draft itself. „Yet by the same 
token, the author has not taken anything else out of the commons and so does not run 
into the joint contribution objections that undermine the power of the first possession 
rule for tangible objects. The only function of legal intervention here is to protect that 
investment in labor, without any expropriation.‟
111
 I think this is indeed an important 
remark. However, Epstein makes an even more interesting point regarding the 
“cultural common” for inspiration and ideas. Obviously, it is not solely the mental 
activity which creates inventions or art. „All individuals are constantly subject to a 
wide range of external influences, which enrich their works. (…) [S]ome believe the 
creation of the copyright monopoly is one of the factors that prevents the 
proportionate response of return to labor.‟
112
 But according to Epstein, this leaves us 
with the ridiculous challenge to reason who gets how much credit for the influences 
that lead to the work or innovation. His answer to this specific challenge is the same 
as it is in the general case – confession and avoidance: 
 
„There is little question that all these influences come to bear on the individual 
author. But by the same token, it is possible to locate in one person, or a small 
group of joint authors, the creative spark or hard effort that took these 
disparate influences and melded them into a coherent work, worthy of our 
attention. The others with whom the creator works can protect themselves by 
contract. It thereby gives the entire claim to the one person who has 
contributed the lion‟s share to the finished product, with the precise intention 




Epstein also assesses how serious the conflict is between copyright and freedom of 
speech, and finds similarities with the “cultural commons” discussed above. His view 
is that we deal with a common domain of ordinary speech and language that is outside 
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the scope of the copyright law, which facilitates creation of writings that are properly 
subject to protection under the law. „The legal monopoly conferred by a copyright or a 
patent need not translate itself into an economic monopoly so long as there are close 
substitutes, as there are for every new popular song that is released.‟
114
 In this field, 
Epstein‟s opinion has close relations to the utilitarian statements regarding monopoly, 
and its focus on substitutes even rings the “libertarian bell” that the market will settle 
this competition by itself. Of course, there is a significant difference between songs or 
musical work (copyrights), and, for example, genetic material (patents). Generally, 
everyone agrees that the duration for a patent, if any, should be shorter than that of a 
copyright, but beyond that, there are considerable differences in opinion. Epstein 
thinks that the problem is well handled by traditional doctrines, but he realizes that 
there is a group of „others who think, even more emphatically, quite the opposite.‟
115
 
 Epstein‟s analysis regarding the sources of creation is also acknowledged by 
Kinsella. He expresses this by commenting on the work of his “opponent” Rand. 
Concerning patents, Rand notes that a discovery cannot be patented, only an invention 
can. She explains this by stressing that discovery identifies a law of nature, a principle 
or a fact of reality not previously known. „[A discovery] cannot be the exclusive 
property of the discoverer because: (a) he did not create it, and (b) if he cares to make 
his discovery public, claiming it to be true, he cannot demand that men continue to 
pursue or practice falsehoods except by his permission.‟
116
 However, Kinsella thinks 
that a distinction between creation and discovery is ethically irrelevant in defining 
property rights. „No one creates matter; they just manipulate and grapple with it 
according to physical laws. In this sense, no one really creates anything. They merely 
rearrange matter into new arrangements and patterns.‟
117
 After giving some examples 
about how people would be ignorant of ways matter can be manipulated and utilized, 
Kinsella comes to the point where Epstein ends: adopting a limited term for IP rights. 
This, as opposed to a perpetual right, also requires arbitrary rules.  
 
„No one can seriously maintain that nineteen years for a patent is too short, 
and twenty-one years too long, any more than the current price for a gallon of 
milk can be objectively classified as too low or too high. Thus, one problem 
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with the natural-rights approach to validating IP is that it necessarily involves 
arbitrary distinctions with respect to what classes of creations deserve 




Kinsella is clearly correct about the arbitrariness of the validity of a copyright or a 
patent. Moreover, it is an argument that reminds us of Bell‟s aversion to the lack of 
measurability of the economic benefits of a system of IP rights. The fact that a certain 
regulation must rely on arbitrary conditions chosen by the state is clearly a reason for 
many libertarians to disapprove of this regulation. 
 
 
4.3 Discussing scarcity 
 
As I already made clear while handling the theorists with a utilitarian background, the 
fundamental idea for the anti-IP libertarians is that property rights are necessary 
because tangible goods are naturally scarce (as analyzed in chapter 2), unlike ideas. 
According to the antagonists, scarcity should not be created. „Prima facie, therefore, 
IP law trespasses against or “takes” the property of tangible property owners, by 
transferring partial ownership to authors and inventors.‟
119
 
 What exactly is the relation between scarcity and creation? In a reply to 
Kinsella in 1995, David Kelley holds that not scarcity, but rather creation is the source 
of property rights. He thinks that property rights are required to support man‟s life by 
the use of his reason, and that the primary task in this context is to create values that 
satisfy human needs, rather than relying on what we find in nature:  
 
„The essential basis of property rights lies in the phenomenon of creating 
value. Scarcity becomes a relevant issue when we consider the use of things in 
nature, such as land as inputs to the process of creating value. As a general 
rule, I would say that two conditions are required in order to appropriate things 
in nature and make them one's property: (1 ) one must put them to some 
productive use, and (2) that productive use must require exclusive control over 
them, i.e., the right to exclude. Condition (2) holds only when the resource is 
scarce. But for things that one has created, such as a new product, one‟s act of 
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Rand and Murray Franck have the same opinion.
121
 Nevertheless, Kinsella disagrees 
and focuses on the first possessor. „Given scarcity,‟ he states, „and the correspondent 
possibility of conflict in the use of resources, these conflicts are avoided and peace 
and cooperation are achieved by allocating property rights to such resources.‟
122
 
Referring to Hoppe, Kinsella continues:  
 
„For if rules allocating property rights are to serve as objective rules that all 
can agree upon so as to avoid conflict, they cannot be biased or arbitrary. For 
this reason, unowned resources come to be owned – homesteaded or 
appropriated – by the first possessor.
123
 The general rule, then, is that 
ownership of a given scarce resource can be identified by determining who 
first occupied it. (…) However, “creation” itself does not justify ownership in 
things; it is neither necessary nor sufficient. One cannot create some possibly 
disputed scarce resource without first using the raw materials used to create 
the item. But these raw materials are scarce, and either I own them or I do not. 
If not, then I do not own the resulting product. If I own the inputs, then, by 





This takes us back to the basis of property in the libertarian context. To discuss 
scarcity as Kinsella does, rooting it as the essence of his solution, I get back to Epstein 
once again. He highlights the problems of first ownership and mixing labor in 
situations where it is not clear who owns raw materials. First, he thinks it is not right 
to treat all resources as res nullius (things owned by no one) instead of res commune 
(things that are common property). This raises the problem of distinguishing people 
who take innocently from those who take in bad faith, and how to handle both of these 
characters in the correct way. The outcomes, according to Epstein, are unsatisfying 
and „not the sets of results Locke had hoped to achieve by mixing private labor with 
commonly owned natural resources. However, it follows inexorably from his 
description of the initial ownership position.‟
125
 
 Indeed, sidestepping from these problems (treating the gifts of nature as res 
nullius) shifts the system in such a way that every individual can take as much as he 
pleases. This actually brings up the question of what exactly an individual is required 
to do in order to become an owner. Epstein asks himself what is of greater 
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importance, and whether the mixing of one‟s labor is part of appropriation or already 
the “creating” phase: 
 
„Locke in a sense has it all backwards.  The purpose of the first possession rule 
is to allow for the easy acquisition of material things so that their owners will 
be in a position to expend labor on them. It makes sense to demand the huge 
expenditures of labor as a precondition of ownership. Locke only alludes to 
that erroneous view because he wants to make the pre-existing value of natural 
resources small relative to the labor used to improve them. That might be true 
in some cases, but not for all. (…) The movement from res commune to res 
nullius escapes the serious objections to the theory of combining labor with 
external objects, but standing alone it does not answer all questions that the 





This explains how Epstein finds the link between liberty and property that he applies 
to intellectual property. „There is an unearned increment of talent or wealth that is not 
deserved under some strong theory of individual moral desert.‟
127
 However, in the 
opinion of Epstein this is not a big problem, because the general case will be that no 
one else could mount a claim based on desert either. That is why according to Epstein 
„[t]he best solution is to develop some cheap rule that allows individuals to mark off 
property as their own as cheaply as possible.‟
128
 The limitations by law are designed 
to continue the process of creating long-term social improvement by sensible 
incremental modifications of a system of property rights, and not to challenge the 




 Paul Cwik, who expressed his criticism of Kinsella‟s statements in 2008, 
supports Epstein with regard to the disagreement with Kinsella‟s scarcity-doctrine. 
Cwik questions whether IP rights fit into a system of Austrian Economics, and 
answers affirmatively. He especially disagrees with Kinsella„s belief that his approach 
is a correct interpretation of Rothbard‟s findings, as Cwik stresses that the correct 
interpretation of Rothbard‟s The Ethics of Liberty sees that there is most certainly 
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room for IP rights in Austrian Economics.
130
 His conclusion is that IP rights would 
benefit the society pursued by libertarians: 
 
„Rights are designed to reduce conflict and without IP rights some may 
perceive the copiers of another work as parasites and things could turn nasty. 
Austrian economists have been at the vanguard on tissues such as privatizing 
the commons, creating private companies to provide public goods, and 
creating property rights to solve problems of externalities. (…) It is up to us to 




The complexity of this thesis is made clear by the way in which libertarians argue 
about the explanations of well-established founders of the libertarian body of thought. 
In the end, it seems that while the proponents of IP rights take a small step back from 
their downright laissez-faire ideas, they are able to express an underpinned opinion 
about why IP rights are fair, or at least, not unfair. I wish to conclude this chapter by 
highlighting the way that Epstein acknowledges the friction, but finds himself able to 
rest with the compromise: 
 
„Quite simply, any system of property imposes heavy costs of exclusion. 
However, these costs can only be eliminated by adopting some system of 
collective ownership that for its part imposes heavy costs of governance. The 
only choice that we have is to pick the lesser of two evils. There is no magic 
solution for liberty or property that creates benefits without dislocations. But 
once we recognize that trade-offs are an inescapable feature of social activity, 








Libertarians have diverse opinions about how intellectual property fits into a free 
market-society. Three distinct groups are relevant when it comes to IP rights from a 
laissez-faire perspective: utilitarians, natural rights theorists and antagonists.  
 The utilitarians focus on rewarding inventors by offering exclusivity against 
third parties in order to improve innovation, and have the opinion that the effect of 
this is demonstrably positive. Antagonists disagree and think that the arbitrariness and 
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lack of measurability are reason enough not to protect patents and copyrights with 
simulated rights. When it comes to the doctrine of using contracts to protect works, 
both parties agree about the inability to protect creations in such a way. The difference 
is that utilitarian‟s think this is a problem with regard to innovation and prosperity, 
while antagonists have the view that this is harmless. Concerning the fact that the 
antagonists state that the artificial monopolies are unacceptable because they are 
illegitimate privileges due to state intervention, utilitarians remark that a copyright or 
patent is only one aspect of competition and is therefore limited in influence. This will 
not convince antagonists, since one of their most fundamental statements in this area 
is that the law exists not for wealth maximization, but rather only for justice. 
 The dispute between natural rights theorist and antagonists goes back to 
property, scarcity and creation. Locke‟s proviso is being interpreted so that one owns 
the intellectual property one creates, because one owns himself and his labor. 
Antagonists claim that the outcome actually contradicts Locke‟s justification of 
property, and that IP rights are exceptions to the free society. Whether purely based 
on Locke‟s thoughts or not, natural rights theorists realize that society‟s “common 
pool” of resources demands for a compromise that exists in an IP rights system. 
Again, arbitrariness is one of the main complaints regarding this solution and is 
deemed unacceptable by the antagonists, who heavily disagree with the statement that 
creation is a source of property rights. They consider natural scarcity the one and only 
basis for property, but in the end there are many pertinent views that negate this 
rationale. 
 In my opinion, the view on resources in a res commune way (rather than res 
nullius) is a valid one that actually makes the plea for compromise the most deliberate 












5 Criticism of libertarians and their views on intellectual property 
 
When it comes to intellectual property rights, libertarians clearly debate much 
amongst themselves. However, in this last chapter, I wish to take the comparison of 
views one step further. With regard to both the general libertarian idea and their vision 
on IP laws, there are critics that can be considered as liberal who have interesting 
comments on libertarians while still sincerely respecting individual freedom.  
I will especially discuss the body of thought of John Rawls concerning 
disagreements with the libertarian view in general. To further the discussion about 
intellectual property, I will mainly pay attention to theorists Lawrence Lessig and 
James Boyle, both IP experts with a possible solution for the complicated discussion 
regarding IP rights in our modern society.  
 
 
5.1 The Rawlsian disagreement 
 
Nozick‟s work Anarchy, State and Utopia appears to be of great fundamental 
importance to the opinions discussed in the previous chapters. An interesting fact is 
that this writing is partly an answer to the groundbreaking work of liberal theorist 
John Rawls: A Theory of Justice, first published in 1971. In light of this thesis, the 
form of criticism on libertarianism based on Rawls liberal views is a relevant one, 
since Rawlsians consider liberty to be the primary aim of the political system, but 
believe that libertarians underestimate the inequality caused by a (complete) free 
market society.  
An impressive number of writers carried out parallel studies comparing the 
ideas of Nozick and Rawls. An important one is Will Kymlicka, writer of the in 1990 
released work Contemporary Political Philosophy, in which he clearly supports 
Rawls‟ theory which can be described as “justice as fairness.” Rawls bases his theory 
on the two pillars that together should lead to this fairness: the principle of equal 
liberty and the difference principle.
133
 Rawls agrees with Nozick that liberty is an 
important aspect of a fair society, but he does not support the extreme way in which 
Nozick thinks individual liberty should be respected and untouched no matter what. 
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As we have discussed earlier, according to Nozick, every individual is entitled to the 
goods he currently possesses, and the goods should be distributed in a free market 
through free and voluntarily exchanges. Everyone should be allowed to use their own 
possessions in whatever manner they wish, as long as he practices this without 
intervention of third parties. Besides this, people own themselves, and every 
individual should be seen as an “end,” and not as a “mean” for other ends without 
their consent. Taxation is the main example of individuals as means.  
Why does Rawls think that this does not lead to justice as fairness, and what 
are the grounds for his view that the state has rights over at least a portion of 
individuals‟ goods and the distribution thereof? Kymlicka supports the opinion of 
liberals. He states that taxation removes undeserved disadvantages in people‟s 
circumstances, and that it is fair to provide limits on the way resources can be 
transferred. A taxation scheme is a proper way of continuing to mitigate the effects of 
undeserved natural disadvantages after that initial distribution, in order to implement 
„a more general right to a fair go in life.‟
134
 This Rawlsian idea does not agree with 
Nozick‟s notion that individuals have “absolute rights” over goods they acquired 
through free exchanges. Liberals refer to the fact that obviously a person did not 
choose their natural limitations to pursue prosperity, and for that reason they should 
not suffer because of it. In the end, for whatever reason, a person might be unable to 
produce or generate his own food (a lack of earning power
135
), which without a doubt 
leads to suffering.  
Nozick‟s argument of “self-ownership” generates friction with Rawls principle 
of difference, because he advocates a transfer of a production (made by an individual 
using his talents) to others. However, Rawls‟ ”justice as fairness” theory claims to 
respect these talents and its owner, but because the distribution of talent is a matter of 
luck, disadvantaged people have a legitimate claim on those with advantages, and vice 
versa, the advantaged have a moral obligation to the disadvantaged:  
 
„Liberals accept that I am the legitimate possessor of my talents, and that I am 
free to use them in accordance with my chosen projects. However, liberals say 
that because it is a matter of brute luck that people have the talents they do, 
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their rights over their talents do not include the right to accrue unequal rewards 




Rawls thinks that his “justice as fairness” can be reached by finding a basis for public 
agreement, by finding a way of organizing familiar ideas and principles into a 
conception of political justice that expresses those ideas and principles in a slightly 
different way than before: 
 
„Justice as fairness tries to do this by using a fundamental organizing idea 
within which all ideas and principles can be systematically connected and 
related. This fundamental idea is that of a society as a fair system of social 
cooperation between free and equal persons viewed as fully cooperating 




Applied to individuals, Rawls‟ principle of fairness states that „a person is required to 
do his part as defined by the rules of an institution when two conditions are met: the 
institution is just (or fair; it fulfills the requirements of his two principles) and one has 
voluntarily accepted the benefits of the arrangements or taken advantage of the 
opportunities it offers to further one‟s interests.‟
138
  
I sense a similarity with Mises‟ opinion about the government as mentioned in 
the first chapter of this thesis. Individuals can limit their liberty and end up in consent 
with people who voluntarily restrict their powers and allow others to make decisions 
that influence their lives. However, the libertarian view is that this agreement cannot 
be established by coercion, but only in a free market. 
 In his article on (intellectual) property, Epstein compares Rawls and Locke, 
and states that, according to the Rawlsian view on fairness and redistribution, it „takes 
a good deal of confidence to believe that we have a strong knowledge of the 
determinants of individual success.‟
139
 According to the finding that we do not allow 
individuals to make gifts of what they have created, even to their loved ones, Epstein 
concludes the following:  
 
„[T]he argument has shifted, at least in part, from justice in the acquisition of 
liberty and property to justice in transfer. (…) If people do not own their own 
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talents, they cannot transfer the fruits of their labor to anyone else either, or so 
it would appear. (…) If I do not deserve the fruits of my labor, genetic 




A way to link the general views to the function of IP rights is to assess the (possible) 
effects of IP law on society. In an contribution to a symposium on intellectual 
property and its function for social justice, Anupam Chander and Madhavi Sunder ask  
if the libertarian vision of Nozick is „in ascendance in intellectual property, 
overshadowing Rawls‟s egalitarianism,‟
141
 and find the answer is no. A legal regime 
might be created for one purpose (IP for instrumental reasons), but that should not 
mean that the implications for all other purposes should be ignored. They argue that 
the view that intellectual property law seeks to solve a fundamental problem of 
information economics makes the proponents of the original view single minded: „to 
incentivize the production of information.‟
142
 Chander and Sunder argue that the view 
is too narrow, and therefore the Rawlsian approach is more suitable because (1) 
understanding intellectual property's impact on a variety of social values helps us 
restrain maximalist intellectual property demands; (2) relying on the tax and welfare 
systems to remedy any resulting distributional deficiencies is unrealistic; (3) the 
raison d'etre of Western intellectual property laws is not necessarily globally scalable 
because of varying capacities to innovate; (4) we must attend to the kind of innovation 
that law spurs (for example, does the existing regime adequately incentivize the 
discovery of treatments for poor people's diseases?); and (5) we can best understand 




 The discussion between Rawlsians and libertarians seems to come down to 
certain aspects that we have discovered in dialogues earlier in this paper. The 
(possibility of having) knowledge of the determinations of individual success 
combined with the admissibility of welfare-redistribution on these grounds is an 
important issue that Epstein points out. Besides that, we seem to return to the 
discussion of the measurability of benefits of IP rights in different economic and 
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social fields (like I mentioned before in the discussion with Chicagoans regarding 
private property), where both parties have diverse ideas about fairness and equality. 
 
 
5.2 Different approaches to intellectual property 
 
Over the last decade, a group of theorists have developed a new, interesting approach 
to copyrights in a modern society. Its advocates believe that copyrights developed in 
such a way that we have ended up with an “extreme” IP system that has lost sight of 
its original goal. These legal theorists have the opinion that because of the 
complicated system and strict control of copyright, society misses opportunities in the 
development of culture and creativity (which is one of the goals of IP rights in the 
first place). Lawrence Lessig is one of these writers. He is the founder of a non-profit 
organization called Creative Commons, whose goal is to „increase the amount of 
creativity (cultural, educational, and scientific content) in “the commons” – the body 




Lessig, who is known as a liberal, makes clear that he is not against 
intellectual property. He rather believes that the end does not justify the means 
anymore: „[I]ntellectual property is good. I am in favour of it. Why are we pro-IP? 
Copyright is essential to the creative process. I am wildly on the side of pro-IP, and 
piracy is bad. Is that clear? IP is good; piracy is bad. But here is that really innovative 
suggestion: so too is war bad.‟
145
 Lessig refers to the “war on piracy” that is going on 
in the field of his specialization: software and internet. He argues that society needs a 
balanced IP policy again: 
 
„A sensible policy (…) could be a balanced policy. For most of our history, 
both copyright and patent policies were balanced in just this sense. But we as a 
culture have lost this sense of balance. We have lost the critical eye that helps 
us see the difference between truth and extremism. A certain property 
fundamentalism, having no connection to our tradition, now reigns in this 
culture – bizarrely, and with consequences more grave to the spread of ideas 
and culture than almost any other single policy decision that we as a 
democracy will make.‟ 
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In his attempts to explain how this extremism blocks culture, Lessig often draws a 
parallel with the use of text; words and language. In contemporary society, a teacher 
of English literature is allowed to take two famous pieces of texts and tell the children 
to mix them together and write an essay from them (freedom of text). However, the 
teacher is not allowed to do the same thing with the artwork of George Lucas and 
Hitchcock, because it is called piracy. „We cannot begin to teach this literacy in our 




 The comparison with text and words, which are completely in “the public 
domain,” reminds us of Epstein‟s words that are quoted in chapter 4. In the end, 
everything has its own source, which makes it impossible to track down all the 
different influences of a mix, and allocate percentages of influence, and thus credit, to 
the sources. Acknowledging this, through Creative Commons, advocates of this form 
of open sourcing want to achieve “creative pools” from which everybody can use 
whatever pleases him, as long as his creation also will be made available in the pool. 
The creator can assemble his own package of IP rights, so it is not necessarily 
“thrown” in the pool for everyone to do as he pleases with it. Another aim of the open 
source-idea is a more understandable description of the rights, so that a lay person 
knows what to expect. The system produces a license that comes in three separate 
layers:  
 
„The first, most important layer perhaps, is a commons deed, which expresses 
in a human readable way what the freedoms are that go with this content. 
Second, is a lawyer-readable licence – which actually guarantees the freedoms 
that are associated with this content. Third, critically, a machine-readable 
expression of the freedoms, that makes it so computers around the world can 
begin to gather content on the basis of the freedoms. (…) These three layers 
together are crucial. We need to find a way to make the freedoms 
understandable, unchallengeable and usable in a digital age – understandable 
by ordinary people, unchallengeable by lawyers, and usable by computers. 




Lessig‟s vision in light of this thesis gives no reason to conclude that he has a point of 
view that both pro- and anti-IP libertarians would disagree with. The approach deals 
with the practical side of IP, rather than the theoretical views we discussed earlier. 
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The commons have a proper free market-structure in which contract is the basis for 
the creative pools, and nobody is forced to cooperate with this system.  
 Not everyone is happy with the open source-initiative, and not everyone 
agrees that this could fit in the libertarian body of thought. Microsoft chairman Bill 
Gates, stated that „[t]here is some new modern-day sort of communists, who want to 
get rid of the incentives for musicians and movie makers and software makers under 
various guises, they don‟t think that incentives should exist.‟
148
 
 I don‟t think it is necessary to assess whether this is indeed a “sort of 
communist” point of view. But is it indeed harmful that these rising ideas do not 
include the financial incentive for producers? We noticed in chapter 4 that on a 
theoretical level that is already a very though discussion between utilitarians and IP-
antagonists. However, especially in the field of internet and software, Lessig shows 




 The discontent with the idea of open source from a libertarian point of view 
appeared in a debate between Epstein and James Boyle (present chairperson of 
Creative Commons) in the Financial Times. Epstein recognized the “open source 
movement” as a reaction to the question of how we produce IP in the first place, and 
expresses some problems with open source software.
150
 First, it has not been tested, 
and is likely to be vulnerable because the apparent intention of the provision is to 
“infect” a new program so that all of its content becomes open source software subject 
to the General Public Licence (GPL). Second, the clause might only bind those people 
who know that they are using open source code. This argument points out the same 
problem as the issue of contract in chapter 4. Once the contract protection lapses after 
a few individuals pass the creation from one to another, the open source movement is 
left only to its copyright remedies, which are likely to prove far weaker. Epstein‟s 
third point is that the movement cannot scale up to meet its own successes. Epstein 
compares the commune with a company, and thinks the system might work well in the 
early days, but problems will rise when a given worker wants to quit. The danger of 
immense resentment „can be ducked only by creating a capital structure that gives 
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present employees separable interests in either debt or equity in exchange for their 
contributions to the company. (…) The bottom line is that idealistic communes cannot 
last for the long haul.‟
151
 
 Boyle disagrees, and bases his answer on two guidelines: listen to the market, 
and assume judicial common sense. Regarding the first of these guidelines, Boyle 
thinks that with Epstein‟s free market-view as a starting point, different conclusions 
should be drawn: 
 
„In his scholarship, Prof Epstein has pointed out eloquently that the market is 
the best information processing system we have: we should assume that it is 
incorporating all available information. If we apply his principle here, it 
indicates that the market has weighed his fears and found them wanting. In my 
view, the market is discounting Microsoft‟s stocks moderately because of fears 
about the competitive challenge posed by open source, and discounting open 
source-reliant stocks mildly, because of fears about legal challenges to the 




As an example of a concurrent of Microsoft, Boyle names IBM („not known for 
investing billions of dollars into the businesses built on licences that are 
simultaneously vague and imperialistic‟
153
). Boyle and Epstein have different ideas 
about the combination of open source and free market. Boyle concludes his opinion 
regarding this topic by stating that „[t]hat does not mean that the free software 
movement will inevitably triumph. Nor does it imply that the GPL is seamless – no 
licence is. But every business has an element of legal risk, or contract-uncertainty; the 




 Regarding the second part of Epstein‟s disbelief in open source, Boyle denies 
that we can speak of a “commune,” holding tangible property in common and 
excluding the rest of us. He rather sees it as „a community, creating an offering to the 
entire world the ability to use, for free, non-rival goods that all of us can have, use and 
re-interpret as we wish.‟
155
 With regard to influence of government, the two are not 
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that distinct. To the statement that if open source is less effective than proprietary 
software, that gap should not be ignored by positing some positive network 
externalities that come from giving it a larger base, Boyle answers the following: 
 
„Given that initial “if”, I think this is a reasonable point. If open source 
software is less effective, government should not be investing in it. (Some 
people assume it will always be superior: I do not.) The point, of course, is 
that most of the government recommendations to invest in open source are 
based on assessments that, for a particular task, open source is actually 
superior and that adopting open source has important benefits because of its 
design – including ease of modification, and ability credibly to pressure 




I wish to stress again that this particular topic only deals with a small part of the 
complicated IP discussion between libertarians. However, it is an interesting aspect of 
copyrights and patents that shows the matter from a different angle than we are used 
to in this paper. Unlike Bill Gates, I think that the ideas of the open source movement 
have a lot in common with the libertarian body of thought. The way they are dealing 
with (mainly digital) IP is based on contract, free will and well-defined derivatives 
from property that does not interfere with the rights of other individuals. It rather is a 
practical approach to the “extremism” that the creative common advocates sense in 
today‟s IP practice. This also appears from Epstein‟s vision on the topic, which 
indicates that it is particularly the feasibility of these projects that he questions.  
 In the conclusion of Free Culture, Lessig shows how the IP extremism 
emerges in today‟s society by detailing an example that deals with the AIDS problem 
in sub-Saharan Africa. In this example, Lessig shows that the main factor in the 
current undesirable IP system is the government. Patents make HIV treatment 
extremely expensive, and although Lessig is an advocate of a drug patent system, 
according to him, (because of intensive lobbies) the United States government is not 
acknowledging that they are dealing with a crisis and therefore too strongly and 
extremely protecting the patents of (in this case) drug companies.  
 
„The corruption is our own politicians‟ failure of integrity. For the drug 
companies would love – they say, and I believe them – to sell their drugs as 
                                                 
156














cheaply as they can to countries in Africa and elsewhere. There are issues 
they‟d have to resolve to make sure the drugs didn‟t get back into the United 
States, but those are mere problems of technology. They could be overcome. A 
different problem, however, could not be overcome. This is the fear of the 
grandstanding politician who could call the presidents of the drug companies 
before a Senate of House hearing, and ask, “How is it you can sell this HIV 
drug in Africa for only $1 a pill, but the same drug would cost an American 
$1,500?” Because there is no “sound bite” answer to that question, its effect 
would be to induce regulation of prices in America. The drug companies thus 




What Lessig wants to make clear is that our society has lost the sense of balance; the  
insight between truth and extremism. „A certain property fundamentalism, having no 
connection to our tradition, now reigns in this culture – bizarrely, and with 
consequences more grave to the spread of ideas and culture than almost any other 
single policy decision that we as a democracy will make.‟
158
 
 This is only one of Lessig‟s range of examples of where a strict appliance of 
IP legislation conflicts with desirable (cultural) situations. His solution does not 
contain one of the libertarian views we discussed in chapter 4, but rather aims at a 





Libertarians receive extensive critiques from theorists with a liberal point of view. 
Supporters of Rawls “egalitarian” approach have problems with the general free-
market views of libertarians because they deny the unfair situations of unequally 
divided talents and capacities. However, when we apply the Rawlsian view to the 
topic of IP theory, we find points of controversy that are similar to the discussion 
between libertarians themselves: the (possibility of having) knowledge of the 
determinations of individual success combined with the admissibility of welfare-
redistribution on these grounds, and the measurability of benefits of IP rights in 
different economical and social fields. 
 The ideas of the open source movement have a different relation to the 
libertarian body of thought. They advocate an approach that for a small part criticizes 
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the theory, but mainly focuses on the practical development of IP rights within the 
current system. Lessig, Boyle and their constituency are pro-IP, but foresee losses in 
culture and social welfare if governments keep on running the system in the extreme 
way they do today. It is not a clear-cut resistance to libertarianism. In fact, in my 
opinion, the ideas of libertarian antagonists of IP have a lot in common with the way 
the open source movement shapes and promotes creative commons. On the whole, we 
can conclude that amongst both (most) libertarians and open source advocates, there is 
a general discontent with the way IP regulations can and do effect the distribution of 














Libertarians believe that through the means of a free market and private property, 
harmony and mutual benefit with regard to economy and society will be reached. In 
their opinion, political authority is not necessary – it is even undesirable – for the 
social cooperation that is essential for life. A commonly stated libertarian principle is 
that a stateless or minimal state situation encourages people to cooperate intensively, 
because they will find out that effectively, this is most beneficial. The main problem 
laissez-faire theorists express about government is the fact that the state is the only 
institution allowed to use coercion, which creates a conflict with individual freedom. 
In a free market-society there is room for state-like structures, but only on a voluntary 
basis.  
 The basic concept of property from a libertarian point of view is scarcity. 
Liberal founding father Locke introduced the theory of mixing labor in order to 
appropriate goods, which is still the most important approach within libertarianism. It 
is not surprising that the major dilemma concerns where a legal system should draw 
the lines to limit one person‟s use of his rights in order to protect the rights of another 
individual. That is the aspect of the theory that slightly separates libertarians. An 
important (Pareto) theory that stresses how private property stimulates prosperity is 
the idea that, motivated by the desire of increasing (individual) social welfare, owners 
will transfer appropriated goods if they are convinced that what they acquire has more 
value to them than what they give up. Liberal (Chicagoan) critics of this view do not 
agree with the libertarian system of first appropriation combined with the Pareto-
efficiency. Chicagoans generally prefer a way of financial allocation to maximize 
wealth and value of production. In this discussion, I have more understanding for the 
libertarian view that it is scientifically impossible to redistribute welfare in such a 
way, and that it just increases arbitrariness, which is immoral and undesirable due to 
its inability to determine situations in advance. 
 Intellectual property theories that are used by libertarian writers can be divided 
into utilitarianism and natural rights. According to utilitarians, society benefits from 
created works and inventions. Mill‟s happiness principle, holding that as long as an 
intellectual work does not hurt society, it is beneficial and the system should stimulate 












forms based on personhood (introduced by Hegel) and based on labor (introduced by 
Locke). Probably because Hegel‟s theory is too undefined towards utilitarians or 
Locke‟s labor theory for libertarians to base their views on it, libertarian natural rights 
advocates use Locke as a starting point. This means “mixing labor” is their basis, 
instead of reward, will and personhood.  
 Libertarian proponents rooted in utilitarianism focus on rewarding inventors  
by offering exclusivity against third parties in order to improve innovation, and have 
the opinion that this effect is demonstrably positive. The reason that antagonists 
disagree (because of arbitrariness and lack of measurability) follows the common 
libertarian argumentation that is a response to virtually all attempts to redistribute 
welfare and re-address prosperity fairly. Regarding the doctrine of the use of contracts 
to protect works, both utilitarians and antagonists agree about the inability to protect 
creations in such a way. The difference is that utilitarians think this is a problem 
regarding innovation and prosperity, while antagonists consider it harmless. 
Antagonists state that the artificial monopolies are unacceptable, for they are 
illegitimate privileges due to state intervention. Utilitarians, however, think that a 
copyright or patent is only one aspect of competition and is therefore barely 
influential. Again, this raises the antagonist answer that the law exists not for wealth 
maximization, but rather only for justice. For natural rights theorist and antagonists, 
the discussion goes back to property, scarcity and creation. Antagonists claim that the 
outcome of Locke‟s proviso actually contradicts his justification of property. IP rights 
are exceptions to the free society. Natural rights theorists acknowledge that society‟s 
“common pool” of resources asks for a compromise that exists in an IP rights system. 
Again, arbitrariness is one of the main complaints about this solution. Antagonists do 
not accept this rationale, and strongly disagree with the statement that creation is a 
source of property rights. In their opinion, natural scarcity is the one and only basis 
for property. I believe that the practical view on resources in a res commune way 
(rather than res nullius) is a valid one that actually makes the plea for compromise 
deliberate and adjective. 
 Though there is much debate and criticism amongst Libertarians, there are also 
critical remarks by other (liberal) theorists. An important contribution is the Rawlsian 
“egalitarian” approach, which disagrees with the general free-market views of 












and capacities. Just as within the libertarian discussion, the (possibility of having) 
knowledge of the determinations of individual success combined with the 
admissibility of welfare-redistribution on these grounds, and the measurability of 
benefits of IP rights in different economic and social fields, is the skeptical answer of 
libertarians to the Rawlsian alternative. 
Advocates of open source commons express the realization that the theories 
might not be the problem, but rather find fault with the extremism with which people 
adhere to the chosen path. They support an approach that for a small part criticizes the 
theory, but mainly focuses on the practical development of IP rights within the current 
system. While advocates of IP regulation, these writers foresee losses in culture and 
social welfare if governments continue to run the system in the extreme way that they 
do today. One should realize that this is not a resistance to libertarianism, but rather 
creates possibilities for overlap and mutual concessions that can lead to desirable 
solutions that could have best of both (utilitarian and natural rights) worlds. 
 Antagonists of intellectual property are probably the theorists who apply the 
general libertarian thought most strictly to IP rights. Lack of possibilities to measure, 
predict and regulate lead to arbitrariness. However, in the broad range of things, and 
given circumstances and context of society today, there is a need for concessions. 
Concessions that acknowledge that when it comes to creation, everything is relative 
since there are innumerable, untraceable influences that a creator uses with or without 
even knowing it. Concessions that leave space for contracts that make use possible, 
whether it is free or paid. Concessions which are designed to follow the theory with 
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